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INTRODUCTION
The summer of 2003 was the Supreme Court's summer of love. In
one week in June, the Court handed down both Lawrence v. Texas1 and
Grutter v. Bollinger.2 The Court had finally embraced multiculturalism,
and the Constitution had come out of the closet. Lawrence had
decriminalized 3 and, by many accounts, decloseted homosexual sod-
omy.4 The Court's decision in Grutter was hailed as bringing down a
similar closet, a twenty-five year regime of "winks, nods, and disguises"
in higher education admissions. 5 The "winks, nods, and disguises" arose
from uncertainty about the validity of Justice Powell's tiebreaking con-
currence in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,6 which stated
that diversity could be a compelling state interest, and about the effects
1 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
4 See, e.g., James W. Paulsen, The Significance of Lawrence v. Texas, 41 Hous. LAW.
32, 37, 38 (2004) (noting that "the Court's decision to frame the issue as protecting an individ-
ual's liberty to engage in private conduct free from state intervention creates a ruling that
sweeps broadly" and that "it is hard not to come away with the impression that... Lawrence's
effects will likely ripple across the nation for years to come"); Lambda Legal, Lawrence v.
Texas, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/in-court/caseslawrence-v-texas.html ("The mere
existence of sodomy laws often had been used to justify wholesale discrimination against
LGBT people. In striking down those laws, this historic ruling removed a major roadblock in
the battle for LGBT rights. No longer can gay people be considered 'criminals' because they
love others of the same sex.").
5 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The use of
diversity in admissions processes became a "longstanding and widespread practice" and "an
entire generation of Americans has been schooled" in accordance with its principles. Brief for
Judith Areen et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18-19, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241). Thomas J. Kane estimated that "a marked degree of racial
preference is given within only the top 20 percent of all four-year institutions." WILLLAM G.
BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER 15 n.l (1998).
6 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 317, 320 (1978).
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of subsequent lower court decisions-most notably the Fifth Circuit's
rejection of the diversity rationale in Hopwood v. Texas.7
Now, Grutter offered a clear statement that higher education offi-
cials could adopt race-conscious admissions for the purpose of assem-
bling a diverse student body. Grutter's holding seemed to permit
tentative diversity-conscious admissions policies to come into the light.8
It appeared to soften the harsh rules of racial regulation by introducing
flexible standards sensitive to American realities. These standards prom-
ised breathing room for race consciousness (rather than strict colorblind-
ness), qualitative (rather than quantitative) evaluation of applicants, and
substantive equality (rather than formal equality). Specifically, Grutter
appeared to sanction three new liberties for higher education administra-
tors: deference to academic judgment in the event of a legal challenge,
discretion in the admissions office, and appreciation of minority stu-
dents' voices.
These liberties appeared to signal permission to depart from a color-
blind mandate. First, regarding deference, the Court revitalized a cate-
gory of review, untapped since Korematsu v. United States, of strict
scrutiny with deference. 9 Grutter proved that the Court's searching re-
view of racial classifications was not "fatal in fact"' 0 and that racial clas-
sifications were not categorically forbidden. Second, the Court permitted
administrators to exercise discretion when selecting students, as long as
the school gave careful attention to each application, a policy now known
as "individualized review."' 1 It was thought that individualized review
would offer administrators freedom from the rigidity of racial quotas or
test scores.1 2 Finally, nested within that discretion, individualized review
allowed administrators to listen to "minority voices."' 3 For the first
time, admissions officers could openly credit what students told them
about growing up a non-white in America. In sum, Grutter promised
administrators the freedom to do their jobs and serve all the aspiring
students of our diverse nation, lifting the troubling mandate of
colorblindness.
7 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (Hopwood I) (holding that diversity is not a compelling
state interest).
8 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. The Court and administrators complying with the Grutter
decision use the phrase race conscious. Others have used race consciousness to signal a more
radical racial equality agenda. See, e.g., Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758
(1990). To minimize confusion, I use the term diversity conscious when referring to Grutter
and the admissions policies it permits.
9 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
10 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1988).
11 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-28.
12 See id.
13 See id.
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Five years have passed since Grutter came down, and it is time to
begin evaluating its effects. 14 The results are somewhat unexpected.
Just as scholars have critiqued the perception that Lawrence marked the
demise of the same-sex closet,' 5 this Article will argue that the question
of whether Grutter challenges colorblindness remains open. Instead, the
freedoms bestowed by Grutter have, paradoxically, intensified colorblind
regulation. Reinscribed in the once revolutionary category of "race con-
sciousness" 16 is the familiar struggle between colorblindness and radical
race consciousness.
This Article will describe how deference, discretion, and voice per-
form that reinscription. First, it will argue that the alternatives to strict
scrutiny's fatalism appear to be increased formality, record keeping, and
research. Staying out of court requires a cautious approach to race con-
sciousness, and vulnerability to lawsuits discourages challenge to the col-
orblind status quo. Second, it will argue that diversity-conscious
individualized review reinforces colorblindness because the diversity
standard has, in practice, itself become a colorblind calibration.' 7 Fi-
nally, this Article will review candidates' personal statements, examining
how they perform a highly standardized practice of articulating the color-
blind values. Operating together, courts, administrators, and students are
producing a type of racial knowledge called diversity which, on the sur-
face, openly acknowledges group-based race consciousness. More care-
ful review, however, reveals that the knowledge also reaffirms
individualist values of colorblindness.
Thus, this Article offers a response to those racial justice advocates
regretting Grutter's limitations.' 8 I argue that Grutter in fact extended
14 Indeed, if the majority's twenty-five year clock on the permissibility of race-conscious
admissions is literally interpreted, we are a fifth of the way through the experiment. See id. at
543 (stating, "25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today.").
15 See, e.g., Libby Adler, The Future of Sodomy, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 228-29
(2005) (identifying five "danger signs" in the Lawrence decision for "[liegal actors interested
in maximizing the room for benign sexual variation, minimizing the suspicion and politics of
shame that plague sex, and interrupting the cycle that reproduces the injured gay identity");
Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1399 (2004); Jose Gabilondo, Asking the Straight Question: How to Come to Speech in Spite
of Conceptual Liquidation as a Homosexual, 21 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 23 (2006)
("Decriminalizing gay sex certainly reflects a move up the brain stem, but this marginal vic-
tory seems radical only as part of a homely progress narrative built on backward-looking
historical arguments.").
16 See Peller, supra note 8.
17 I often refer to the diversity-conscious admissions process as standardization, that is,
the translation of racial, athletic, artistic, and other extracurricular bodies into a broad scale
that can account for, and compare, all applicants. Standardization is quite a different idea from
the transition from rules to standards that I discussed above.
18 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at
the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REV. 113, 197 (2003) ("[T]he approval of
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the Court's colorblind hold on race relations to the minute and routine
administration of higher education admissions policies. As a result, col-
orblindness has diffused into actions that appear to be quintessential ex-
ercises of freedom and race consciousness. Part I provides some
background on the history of the term race consciousness and its multi-
ple meanings in civil rights legal culture. Part II questions the assump-
tion that the Court increased the independence of administrators by
sanctioning deference to academic judgment and individualized review.
It argues that strict scrutiny with deference is not the equivalent to the
"abandon[ment] of strict scrutiny." 19 Rather, strict scrutiny with defer-
ence is a new category that establishes a new method of regulation; it is a
reorganization of the division of labor between the Court and the admin-
istrators. Part II further argues that the concept of individualized review
promotes a colorblind standardization of race. With strict scrutiny plus
deference and individualized review, Grutter established a new adminis-
trative framework that would reproduce colorblindness within race con-
sciousness. Parts III and IV examine colleges' and universities'
compliance with Grutter. Part III reviews Grutter compliance manuals
and describes how strict scrutiny with deference shapes deference in a
way that ensures administrators' loyalty to principles of formal equality
and colorblindness. Part IV discusses the. regulatory valence of discre-
tion as it is practiced. The substantial weight still accorded to academic
scores, the elaborate techniques for standardizing, comparing, and evalu-
ating applications, and the routine training and monitoring of application
readers combine to make the exercise of discretion a highly mechanized
and normalizing event. Part IV further argues that, like deference, dis-
cretion ultimately reinforces-rather than challenges-colorblindness.
limited forms of race-consciousness may invite complacency rather than vigilance."); Kevin R.
Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172
(2004) (arguing that the Court's expected twenty-five year time limit on affirmative action is
unrealistic); Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light, Teaching Race Without a Critical
Mass: Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Diversity Rationale, J. LEGAL EDUC. 316, 317
(2004) ("We identify two significant limitations on the practical applicability of Grutter's ra-
tionale: first, regardless of ideological bias, students come to the discussion with firmly held, if
ill-informed, opinions on race and affirmative action, and these opinions simply may be rein-
forced in a homogeneous classroom; and second, while beneficial in theory, a spirited debate
over affirmative action may detrimentally affect the educational environment for the few stu-
dents of color in the classroom."); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CoNsT.
COMMENT. 221, 230 (2004) ("Although Grutter has now authorized the use of affirmative
action to promote diversity, it has nevertheless reaffirmed the traditional prohibition on using
affirmative action to remedy general societal discritnination.").
19 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Martin D.
Carcieri, Grutter v. Bollinger and Civil Disobedience, 31 U. DAYTON L. REv. 345 (2006);
Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945
(2004); Roger Pilon, Principle and Policy in Public University Admissions: Grutter v. Bollin-
ger and Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 43, 50 (2003).
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Part V turns to student voice. While student voices are generally
viewed as authentic and, therefore, insulated from judicial and adminis-
trative regulation, Part V argues that personal statements function as a
keystone of racial regulation in the Grutter regime. In order to shed light
on the regulatory and reproductive function of personal statements, Part
V compares personal statements with a similar literary genre, the Roman
Catholic confession. This analogy is appropriate because confessions,
like personal statements, are presumed to be authentic, empowering, and
deeply individual. The final section of Part V focuses on a particular
racial knowledge produced by personal statements. It identifies a strand
of racial knowledge called diversity and argues that this knowledge rear-
ticulates colorblind values within the category of difference.
I. THE STRANGE CAREER OF RACE CONSCIOUSNESS
The meaning of race consciousness has changed since Professor
Gary Peller published his landmark article, "Race Consciousness," in
1990.20 While the term still operates as a challenge to conservative in-
tegrationism, it also houses tensions for progressives who hold both indi-
vidualist and group-oriented values. Group-oriented values include
advocacy of group rights to remedy historical and present oppression,
while individualists are more likely to advocate equal access, opportu-
nity, and upward social mobility. The meaning of race consciousness
has changed as the balance between individual and group values has
shifted. Grutter provided the most recent impetus for a substantial re-
balancing, as education officials and scholars debated how to administer
deference, discretion, and voice. In the years since 2003, Grutter has
overseen the reinscription of individualist, colorblind values within a
group-oriented, race-consciousness agenda.
In 1990, Peller contrasted two ideological positions on racial justice:
integrationism and race consciousness. 21 He linked integrationism to a
racial justice agenda of colorblindness as the cure for discrimination. 22
"[I]ntegration means overcoming prejudice based on skin color .... The
ideal [is] to transcend stereotypes in favor of treating people as individu-
als, free from racial group identification. '' 23 Integrationists support the
centralization and professionalization of educational institutions as a way
to eradicate racial distortions, pursuing a "neutral, acultural form that,
precisely because of its impersonality, would treat everyone alike. ' '24
20 See Peller, supra note 8.
21 See generally id.
22 Id. at 770.
23 Id. at 769.
24 Id. at 782.
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Colorblind integrationism entails commitments to the ideals of
truth, universalism, upward mobility, and progress. 25 Peller argues that
these commitments have "worked to legitimate the very social relations
that originally were to be reformed. '26 Specifically,
Integrationists tend to understand racism as a particular,
identifiable deviation from an otherwise rational deci-
sionmaking process that is not itself based in the history
of social struggle between groups and worldviews. This
narrow image of the domain of racial power character-
izes the tendency of liberal integrationism to become
part of a self-justifying ideology of privilege and status.
The realm of "neutral" social practices from which to
identify bias and deviation constitutes a whole realm of
institutional characteristics removed from critical view
as themselves historical, contingent and rooted in the
particularities of culture-a realm that is itself a mani-
festation of group power, of politics. 27
Thus, a key practice of colorblind integrationism identifies a set of
practices as racial, while maintaining that other practices, such as profes-
sionalism and meritocracy, have no racial politics. Peller argues that
those neutral realms are themselves sites of racial politics.
Peller contrasts colorblind integrationism with race consciousness,
which, he argues, derives from a more radical tradition of black national-
ism in the 1960s. 28 Race consciousness resisted the integrationist mind-
sets that dominated civil rights discourse at the time. Unlike colorblind
integrationists, who perceived racism as arbitrary and irrational when
practiced by either whites or blacks, "nationalists viewed race in the par-
ticular context of American history, where racial identity was seen as a
central basis for comprehending the significance of various social rela-
tions as they are actually lived and experienced, and within which the
meaning of race was anything but symmetrical. '29 Black nationalists
used a colonialism metaphor to "captur[e], in one image, the totalizing
sense of alienation between whites and blacks that the rejection of com-
mon nationality represented, the depiction of structural and systematic
25 Id. at 772, 779.
26 Id. at 762-63.
27 Id. at 779.
28 Id. at 758-60.
29 Id. at 791. According to Peller, race consciousness is useful to the extent that it can
critique the neutral integrationist norms. The concept of race consciousness is "a form of
social practice that could pose nationhood against the false universalism of liberal ideology
while nevertheless resisting the tendency to reify the particular as if it were somehow natural,
freestanding, and self-contained." Gary Peller, Notes Toward a Postmodern Nationalism, 1992
U. ILL. L. REV. 1095, 1095 (1992).
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power exercised by the white community. '30 This description of race
consciousness closely approximates Duncan Kennedy's definition of the
radical strand of critical race theory. According to Kennedy, race con-
scious scholars focus on how neutral norms and "rules of the game,"
even as adjusted with anti-discrimination and affirmative action policies,
might reproduce or accentuate differences in education, income, wealth,
and employment. 3 1
A well-known example of the group-based strand of race conscious-
ness is Professor Mar Matsuda's argument that victims of discrimination
"speak with a special voice to which we should listen. '32 Matsuda calls
this method "looking to the bottom. '3 3 In her canonical article by the
same title, Matsuda advocates "a new epistemological source for critical
scholars: the actual experience, history, culture, and intellectual tradition
of people of color in America."'34 Matsuda believes that "looking to the
bottom for ideas about law will tap a valuable source previously over-
looked by legal philosophers. 3 5
Since the publication of Peller's article, the parameters of race con-
sciousness have broadened to include more progressives with individual-
ist loyalties. 36 Individualist values are not incompatible with race
consciousness because individualists have no a priori commitment to as-
similation or integration. 37 However, individualist values are distin-
guishable from group-oriented values in the sense that they accept the
"rules of the game in the white community," including a commitment to
legally enforceable rights derived from property and contract, upward
social mobility, meritocracy, professionalism, a limited government
safety net, and a skepticism of collectivism and mobilization. 38 The
blending of race consciousness with individualist values appears in state-
ments such as Professor Ilhyung Lee's: "[Tihe rationale for race con-
scious policy is to ensure equal access and equal opportunity toward the
end of racial justice .... 39
30 Pellet, supra note 8, at 810-11.
31 See Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing
in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 How. L.J. 85, 120 (2002).
32 Mar Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 63 (Kimberle
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1223 (2002); Ilhyung Lee, Race Consciousness and Minority Schol-
ars, 33 CONN. L. REV. 535, 577 (2001).
37 See Duncan, supra note 31, at 118-19.
38 See id. at 119-20.
39 Lee, supra note 36, at 577.
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In 2003, race consciousness was transformed again under the aus-
pices of Grutter. Many scholars and commentators understood Grutter
as a long-overdue constitutional embrace of race consciousness. Profes-
sor Alfred L. Brophy praised the decision because it "open[ed] up great
possibilities for race-conscious action in school desegregation" and "re-
vitalize[d] race as a category of legal analysis."'40 Higher education lead-
ers responded with a press release stating,
American higher education welcomes today's U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions in [Gratz and Grutter] ....
These decisions enable our institutions to maintain their
strong commitment to be welcoming places to students
of all races and walks of life and to continue to pursue a
wide range of legally permissible means of attaining a
diverse student body.4 1
The Grutter decision suggested that colorblind integrationism in
higher education was no longer constitutionally required. Rather, with
their newly granted deference and discretion, administrators could
openly seek the multicultural, vibrant, robust exchange of ideas that can
happen only when students are confronted with worldviews different
from their own. Race consciousness was no longer a dirty word that
insinuated reverse discrimination; 42 it was invoked with abandon
throughout the Grutter opinion itself,43 and also began to appear in
guides for designing admissions policies. 44 Even conservatives viewed
the Grutter opinion as legitimating race consciousness. 45
The text of Grutter itself, however, did not resolve emerging and
continuing conflicts between the individualist and group-oriented strands
of race consciousness. Upon a first reading, Grutter appears to exem-
plify group-based race consciousness with its embrace of a key tenet of
critical race theory: recognition of minority voices. 46 Individualized re-
view can be seen as group-oriented because it values personal statements
40 ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO & CON 61-62 (2006).
41 American Council on Education, Joint Statement by National Higher Education Lead-
ers on Today's Decision by the Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger
(June 23, 2003), http://www.acenet.edu/AMffemplate.cfm?Section=search&template=/CM/
HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=37 10.
42 See Peller, supra note 8, at 790.
43 The majority uses the term more than twenty times when describing the Law School's
permissible policy. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003).
44 See, e.g., ARTHUR L. COLEMAN & ScoTr R. PALMER, THE COLLEGE BOARD, ADMIS-
SIONS AND DIVERSITY AFTER MICHIGAN: THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEGAL AND POLICY IS-
SUES 9 (2006).
45 See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, A Conservative Comment on Professor Crump, 56 FLA.
L. REV. 789, 799 (2004) (referring to Grutter as a "thinly disguised quota system").
46 For a brief overview of critical race theory, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT Xiii (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
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that discuss a student's group experiences specifically as black or Latino.
The ability to give careful consideration to personal statements, in addi-
tion to test scores and grades, gives administrators a new access to "the
bottom" and a new ability to assemble an incoming class that will benefit
from stories previously excluded.
A closer reading, however, suggests that the race consciousness of
Grutter strengthened the individualist strand of race consciousness. As I
discuss below, individualist values have had a strong hand in governing
the seemingly unregulated liberties of discretion, deference, and voice.
As a result, the administrative effect of Grutter has been to reinscribe
colorblind values under the umbrella of race consciousness. The remain-
der of this Article will track the unfolding of this process, beginning with
the Court's establishment of colorblind mechanisms for higher education
admissions and then reviewing the ways in which administrators and stu-
dents have continued the effort. This Article will examine how defer-
ence, discretion, and voice are sites of conflict between individualist and
group-based race consciousness and how this conflict tends to be re-
solved in a way that reinforces colorblindness.
II. THE REGULATORY READING OF GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
The legal academy and the bar welcomed Grutter as a move away
from colorblindness and toward race consciousness. This reading of
Grutter, however, overlooks aspects of the decision that signal a new
technique of racial regulation. Particularly, the Grutter opinion raises
and answers two key questions regarding the legal administration of race:
(1) how should a school administer a policy that is subject to strict scru-
tiny with deference; and (2) how should a school translate race into an
applicant's file? This part will review the Court's approach to these
questions, highlighting early indications that Grutter would encourage a
colorblind race consciousness. The subsequent parts will examine how
schools and students have followed the Grutter Court's lead, administer-
ing the freedoms of deference, discretion, and voice with a paradoxically
regulatory colorblindness.
A. STRICT SCRUTINY WITH ACADEMIC DEFERENCE
Writing for the majority in Grutter, Justice O'Connor breathed new
life into her admonishment in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena that
"[s]trict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' '47 Before
Grutter, the fatality of strict scrutiny, though not a formal reality, was
47 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
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certainly a functional one. 48 Constitutional law scholar Girardeau Spann
predicted that the Court would soon pronounce strict scrutiny to be fatal,
as it "would be consistent with the history of the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence since Korematsu, and it would satisfy the draconian pro-
nouncements of Justices Scalia and Thomas." 49
When the Grutter majority announced that it would both use strict
scrutiny to review the University of Michigan Law School's admissions
policies and accord academic deference to the expertise of the adminis-
trators, it was lambasted by Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and Kennedy. 50
The dissenters argued that the majority's new "strict scrutiny with defer-
ence" standard was a sham. 5' Justice Thomas denounced the Court's
"unprecedented deference to the Law School" as "antithetical to strict
scrutiny. ' 52 He argued that the majority's deference unconstitutionally
"tolerate[d] institutional devotion to the status quo in admissions policies
when such devotion ripens into racial discrimination. ' 53 Chief Justice
Rehnquist echoed Justice Thomas, stating, "Although the Court recites
the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that review
is unprecedented in its deference. '54
Justice Kennedy's dissent contained the most vehement condemna-
tion of the Court's application of strict scrutiny with deference. For him,
the majority's approach constituted an act of violence against the stan-
dard. He accused the majority of "abandon[ing]," 55 "suspending," 56 and
"damaging" 57 strict scrutiny. For him, the Court had "abdicate[d] its
constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the use of race in university
admissions. '58 Justice Kennedy insinuated that the majority had acted in
bad faith, chastising it for its failure to engage in "scrutiny that is real,
not feigned." 59 He continued, "Were the courts to apply a searching
standard to race-based admissions schemes, that would force educational
48 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 496-99 (1989) (holding that
societal discrimination was not a compelling interest); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986) (holding that preserving the number of minority teachers in Jackson,
Michigan, was not a compelling interest); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (hold-
ing that the "best interest of the child" was not a compelling reason to consider race when
making custody decisions).
49 GIRARDEAU SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIvE ACTION 167 (2000) (referencing Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
50 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378-88 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2008]
526 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:515
institutions to seriously explore race-neutral alternatives. The Court, by
contrast, is willing to be satisfied by the Law School's profession of its
own good faith."'60 According to Justice Kennedy, "[d]eference is anti-
thetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it."6'
The view that deference and strict scrutiny are irreconcilable, how-
ever, did not carry the day. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
emphasized that strict scrutiny of race-based classifications often in-
cludes at least some degree of deference. "Not every decision influenced
by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to provide
a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of
the reasons advanced by the governmental decision-maker for the use of
race in that particular context. ' 62 Deference, Justice O'Connor writes,
plays an important but limited role in that examination:
Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School
is no less strict for taking into account complex educa-
tional judgments in an area that lies primarily within the
expertise of the university. Our holding today is in keep-
ing with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to
a university's academic decisions, within constitution-
ally prescribed limits. 6
3
Strict scrutiny, therefore, still includes a very searching review of
the importance and sincerity of administrators' decisions. 64 Deference is
reserved only for those officials who make complex judgments informed
by administrative expertise. Strict scrutiny with deference, therefore,
keeps schools that pursue diversity-conscious policies vulnerable to chal-
lenge, but carves out an escape route for those administrators who can
demonstrate their expertise when making academic decisions.
This is a novel method of regulation. The Grutter majority traded a
juridical role advanced by the dissenters (strict scrutiny must be near-
fatal) for a disciplinary one (strict scrutiny should incentivize administra-
tors to self-regulate). As a result, strict scrutiny with deference reorgan-
izes the division of labor between educational officials and the Court.
Strict scrutiny shifts the primary policing duties from the courts to the
admissions offices of the universities. Only those administrators who
exercise (and can prove) well-reasoned academic judgments will receive
deference. After Grutter, it is the performance of administrators, rather
than the racial category alone, that will receive searching review.
60 Id. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 327.
63 Id. at 328.
64 See id. at 327.
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A variety of indicators could be used to evaluate that performance.
Schools that choose race consciousness must have good administrators
who unify their missions, develop policies, amass records, periodically
review their policies, form committees, and make a case that the policy
will likely work. Moreover, good administrators' treatment of race must
be a package of legal components (necessitated by the vulnerability trig-
gered by strict scrutiny) and professional components (necessitated by
the Court's dispensation of deference only to expert academic judgment).
Grutter did not permit administrators to do whatever they wanted.
Instead, it adopted a self-policing standard, which integrated the Court's
racial jurisprudence into the mechanics of higher education administra-
tion. This new approach will make mini-Supreme Courts out of higher
education institutions and judicial review will in part play out as admin-
istrative review. As detailed in subsequent sections, colorblindness does
not disappear with this reorganization; rather, the diffusion of authority
ensures that it penetrates deeper into routine administrative decisions.65
B. INDIVIDUALIZED REVIEW
Having reorganized the division of labor between the Court and the
schools, the Grutter Court next outlined a specific policy that would help
establish the basis for deference-individualized review. 66 I argue that
when the Court translated racial categories into a diversity standard it
introduced colorblindness into a purportedly race-conscious program.
Individualized review begins with the applicant's file.67 The exis-
tence of the file is so commonplace that it is easy to forget the problems
that the file purports to solve: how can an admissions officer observe and
judge an applicant who often lives across the country and with whom the
admissions officer has no personal relationship? How should an admis-
sions officer compare one person's life to another's? The file compiles
and processes information, and makes it possible to compare thousands
of individual applicants.
The Grutter majority begins not with the problem of evaluating in-
dividual people, but with a description of the Law School's file review
process:
The Law School ranks among the Nation's top law
schools. It receives more than 3,500 applications each
year for a class of around 350 students. . . . The [Law
School's] policy requires admissions officials to evaluate
each applicant based on all the information available in
65 See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
66 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
67 Id. at 312-15.
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the file, including a personal statement, letters of recom-
mendation, and an essay describing the ways in which
the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of
the Law School. In reviewing an applicant's file, admis-
sions officials must consider the applicant's undergradu-
ate grade point average (GPA) and Law School
Admission Test (LSAT) score because they are impor-
tant (if imperfect) predictors of academic success in law
school .... [T]he policy requires admissions officials to
look beyond grades and test scores to other criteria that
are important to the Law School's educational objec-
tives. So-called "'soft variables"' such as "the enthusi-
asm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate
institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, and the
areas of difficulty of undergraduate course selection,"
are all brought to bear in assessing an "applicant's likely
contributions to the intellectual and social life of the
institution. '6 8
Focusing on the process of reviewing files, rather than on the fiction
of the file itself, privileges an assumption that the file is a person compa-
rable with other persons.69 The applicant is supposedly compensated for
the loss of individuality that occurs as she translates herself into a file
because admissions officers individually consider each element of that
file.70
The idea that it is possible to translate intelligence, drive, and even
character into the fiction of the file has become unremarkable. The Grut-
ter Court's implication that it is possible to translate race the same way
has received equally little attention. While it's easy to elide the differ-
ence between racial experiences in American life and what appears in the
file, it is crucial to remember that the Court's opinion is geared only
toward the latter. The opinion opens an inquiry about how to standardize
race through the file; it is not directly concerned with "real" race.
The doctrinal solution to the problem of translating race, set forth by
Justice Powell in Regents of University of California v. Bakke7t and en-
dorsed by the Grutter Court, is to measure how much diversity each file
could contribute to the incoming class. 72 Diversity does not disturb the
alleged colorblind requirements of the Equal Protection Clause because,
unlike a categorical racial declaration, it does not automatically exclude
68 Id. (citations omitted).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 438 U.S. 265, 314-15 (1978).
72 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
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any applicant. 73 Justice O'Connor's opinion constantly emphasized this
inclusiveness. She reiterated the Law School's recognition of "many
possible bases for diversity admissions," and stressed that diversity could
not be defined "solely in terms of racial and ethnic status."'74 The Court
found that "the Law School's race-conscious admissions program ade-
quately ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body diver-
sity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions
decisions." 75
Twice quoting Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the majority em-
phasized the constitutional necessity of this inclusiveness. "[A]n admis-
sions program must be 'flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and
to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not neces-
sarily according them the same weight.' ",76 This language suggests that
diversity is a constitutional aim only if it is defined in a way that first
standardizes every racial, athletic, musical, and artistic human body onto
the same scale. Once diversity is standardized in this way, the merits of
each applicant can be fairly compared and weighed.
The Court embraced the diversity standard because it could both
assess and benefit all applicants. As evidence of the diversity standard's
broad assessment capabilities, the Court recounted the seemingly endless
incarnations of diversity: "Admittees who have lived or traveled widely
abroad, are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adver-
sity and family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive commu-
nity services, and have had successful careers in other fields. ' 77 As for
diversity's ability to benefit all applicants, the Court said,
[T]he Law School seriously weighs many other diversity
factors that can make a real and dispositive difference
for nonminority applicants as well [because it] suffi-
ciently takes into account, in practice as well as in the-
ory, a wide variety of characteristics besides race and
ethnicity that contribute to a diverse student body.78
As further proof that diversity could help anyone, the Court cited
the Law School's evidence that it "can (and does) select nonminority
applicants who have greater potential to enhance student body diversity
73 Id. at 316.
74 Id. (quoting Appellees' Brief at 111, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No.
02-241)).
75 Id. at 337.
76 Id. at 334, 337 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis
added)).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 338.
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over underrepresented minority applicants. '79 Thus, the diversity stan-
dard applies equally to every applicant. The benefits and burdens of the
program are distributed to applicants with blindness to color.
Finally, the Court approved of individualized review because the
individual-the candidate herself-is a key performer of the racial trans-
lation. 80 The Court characterized personal statements as the applicants'
"opportunity" to "highlight their own potential diversity contributions. ' 81
It is the student who translates herself from a member of racial category
to one of a diversity standard; admissions officials then just make the
comparisons:
Here, the Law School engages in a highly individual-
ized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving seri-
ous consideration to all the ways an applicant might
contribute to a diverse educational environment. The
Law School affords this individualized consideration to
applicants of all races. There is no policy, either de jure
or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection based
on any single "soft" variable. 82
Some scholars have argued that even though the diversity captures
and could benefit anyone (that is, it is colorblind), diversity can still be
race conscious because it is less mechanized. Professor Lani Guinier, for
example, has stated that the Grutter Court did well to distinguish be-
tween "considerations of race that are nuanced, on one hand, and 'mech-
anistic' on the other." 83 But this view hinges on whether, and under
what circumstances, a file can accurately represent a person.84 If the
student-to-file translation is roughly accurate, individualized review
seems to make the file more humane: consider everything about the ap-
plicants, treat them equally, and evaluate them fairly. But when the fic-
tion of the file is acknowledged, diversity becomes a much more
mechanical prescription. 85 The Grutter decision effectively gave admis-
sions officers two normalizing mandates: first, place all applicants on the
same footing by translating individual bodies into measurable units and,
second, measure and select them based on their relative diversity value.
Diversity in this context does not challenge the mechanization of trans-
79 Id. at 341.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 337.
83 Lani Guinier, The Constitution Is Both Colorblind and Color-Conscious, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUc., July 4, 2003, at B 11.
84 Id.
85 Id.
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lating students into files; rather it extends that mechanization to new
dimensions of the self.
The Court's use of the terms "individualized review" and "holistic
review" obscures the fictional and standardizing aspects of file-making
by highlighting the individualized process of reviewing those files. Ho-
listic review presumes that nothing is lost in the translation from racial
body to diverse file. Far from humanizing the application process, indi-
vidualized review further standardizes its subjects. It is a process that
"makes each individual the mirror and measure of his fellow. ' 86 Moreo-
ver, the individuality of individualized review is an inch wide and a mile
deep. It is narrow because all differences, including racial differences,
must be measurable by the diversity standard. Within that standard,
however, diversity produces an infinite number of categories of individu-
alized differences.
In sum, to read the Grutter opinion as providing freedom for race
consciousness is to miss two paradoxical points: (1) academic deference
is not pure liberty; it also infuses the Court's juridical strict scrutiny au-
thority into a self-regulating administrative apparatus; and (2) discretion
does not purely result in more individualized considerations of race; it
also standardizes the racial characteristics and experiences of applicants
and makes them interchangeable with other differences. The following
sections argue that administrators and applicants have heard, even if
others have not, the regulatory note in the Grutter opinion. Further, this
regulation has patently colorblind implications.
III. ADMINISTRATION OF STRICT SCRUTINY
WITH DEFERENCE
For administrators, Grutter's potential for race consciousness is ac-
companied by a new set of burdens. Deference, for the Grutter Court,
also requires a substantial amount of self-policing. This section examines
a key compliance manual published by the College Board, Admissions
and Diversity After Michigan,87 to explore how administrators have com-
plied with Grutter, and how their compliance has reinforced, rather than
resisted, colorblindness.
A. THE MECHANICS OF SURVEILLED DEFERENCE
While admissions policies were never free of red tape, micromanag-
ing, and legal oversight,88 the Grutter decision generated a vast new
86 Francois Ewald, Norms, Discipline, and the Law, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 138, 151
(1990) (discussing peer comparisons as a means of normalization in industry).
87 COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44.
88 See, e.g., Len Niehoff & Butzel Long, Affirmative Action and Diversity Programs:
Issues in University Admissions and Financial Aid, Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Atty's Fall
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literature on compliance.89 This literature differed from earlier compli-
ance guides in its specificity, authority, and broad applicability. 90 Diver-
sity was no longer an experimental option; the role of compliance
literature was no longer to survey a range of potentially applicable cases
and make educated guesses.91 Grutter signaled an overhaul. The post-
Grutter literature examined in this section urges administrators to under-
take a substantial review their admissions policies, their mission state-
ments, and their record keeping practices. Strategic planning should be
initiated; committees should be established; conferences should be held.
Although the popular story posits that Grutter gave administrators
new liberties, compliance literature suggests that Grutter has operated
quite differently. Administrators have taken to heart the Court's invoca-
tion of strict scrutiny. They have begun to makeover their administrative
personas with increased sensitivity to strict scrutiny's shadow of litiga-
tion. Compliance also requires administrators to pursue policies that pro-
duce a clean and extensive record in preparation for likely litigation.
1. Infusing the Institution with Strict Scrutiny
Part of being a professional administrator is having, and docu-
menting, educational goals sound enough to defend against liability. Af-
ter Grutter, the College Board published Admissions and Diversity to
help administrators develop and evaluate their admissions policies. 92
According to this manual, drafting educational goals requires recognition
of the link between legal risk and diversity-related goals. 93 "[T]he ulti-
mate objective [is] achieving [educational] goals while minimizing legal
risk."'94 For ease of comprehension, the manual provides a diagram that
"illustrates the two dimensional nature of the policy development pro-
cess. It shows the duality of consequences that flow from policy deci-
Workshop (Oct. 1998) (discussing federal court decisions on higher education admissions and
diversity policies); D. Frank Vinik & Susan H. Ehringhaus, Conducting a Self-Audit of Your
Admissions Practices and Procedures and Recording and Retaining Admissions Data, Nat'l
Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Atty's Fall Workshop (Sept. 15, 2000) (describing some of the practi-
cal and legal difficulties of admissions policy).
89 See, e.g., COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44 (exploring post-Grutter options for
achieving diversity in admissions policy); Susan 0. Bradshaw, Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: Post Grutter Admissions Practices, Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Atty's Continuing
Legal Education Workshop (March 2-4, 2005); Scott Palmer, et al., Diversity in Student Ad-
missions and Financial Aid: Meeting and Documenting Grutter Threshold Requirements, An-
nual Conference of the Nat'l Ass'n of Coll. & Univ. Atty's (Mar. 21-23, 2007) (discussing the
Grutter threshold requirements).
90 See supra note 89.
91 Niehoff & Long, supra note 88.
92 COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44.
93 Id. at 1.
94 Id.
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sions: relative success in achieving diversity goals and exposure to legal
risk." 95 The diagram looks like this:
HIGH RISK HIGH RISK
Don't Achieve Goals Achieve Goals
LOW RISK LOW RISK
Don't Achieve Goals ,Achieve Goals
In other words, valid educational aims should also limit legal risk. 96
Every goal-oriented decision is also a legal decision about the exposure
of the university to litigation. 97
Administrators are advised to publicize their diversity goals in the
form of a mission statement. "Higher education institutions must be able
to justify their race- and ethnicity-conscious programs with compelling
interests, which are clearly defined and central to the achievement of
each institution's mission."98 Mission statements, therefore, have a
heightened legal significance running alongside their administrative pur-
pose of unifying and guiding administrative decisionmaking. Grutter ex-
panded the audience of a model mission statement beyond institution
members and potential applicants to lawyers and judges who will review
them when evaluating the constitutionality of the university's policies.
In addition to reassessing administrative goals, schools are also ad-
vised to adjust the "key strategies" and "action steps" they use to imple-
ment those goals in a way that limits liability. 99 For example, after
Grutter, the administrative machinery of strategic planning has become
intertwined with strict scrutiny. Strategic planning is a quintessentially
administrative exercise. The exercise employs triads like "situation, tar-
get, path" and "see, think, draw" in order to help administrators set and
pursue institutional goals.100 Compliance with Grutter has come to mean
that strict scrutiny considerations should be incorporated into this exer-
cise. 01 Admissions and Diversity, warns that the Court's deference does
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 9.
99 Id.
100 Wikipedia, Strategic Planning, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic-planning (last
visited Nov. 17, 2007) (citing JOHN NAISBIr, MEGATRENDS: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS TRANS-
FORMING OUR LIVES (1982); Robert W. Bradford & J. Peter Duncan, Simplified Strategic Plan-
ning (2000); Toyohiro Kono, Changing a Company's Strategy and Culture, LONG RANGE
PLANNING, Oct. 1994, at 85; Philip Kotler, Megamarketing, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1986)).
1O COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44, at 9.
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not excuse administrators from strategic planning; to the contrary, "strict
scrutiny analysis centers precisely on these elements." 10 2
For example, if a school, using the "situation, target, path" triad
decides that its target is to recruit and retain a critical mass of minorities,
it must assess its situation and chart a path that gives it the best chances
for surviving strict scrutiny. Because each school has a different situa-
tion and path, administrators cannot generally rely on the fact that the
Court in Grutter accepted Michigan's critical mass rationale. 0 3 Instead,
compliance-and, therefore, insulation from challenge-has come to
mean that each school must carefully frame its own critical mass objec-
tives and support those objectives with general and institutional-specific
evidence. Admissions and Diversity advises administrators that:
Critical mass objectives should be:
* Directly associated with and framed in light of core
educational goals;
* Not tied to rigid numerical targets ...
* Associated with the existing underrepresentation of
minority students on campus-with the concept of
"underrepresentation" being defined specifically with
respect to ranges of minority/subgroup students at
which the educational benefits of diversity can be
achieved on campus (rather than with respect to exter-
nal data regarding, for instance, numbers or percent-
ages of minority high school students in an
institution's service area);
" Based on institution-specific analysis, which may in-
clude data regarding the stages (and ranges) at which
critical mass benefits are likely to be achieved both in
classroom and social settings; and
" Factored into the admissions process in the context of
multiple, and sometimes competing, objectives. 1°4
Compliance with Grutter, therefore, involves significant research,
various analyses based on institution-specific data, and minute levels of
administrative decisionmaking.
In sum, when a school chooses diversity, it should undertake review
of its entire administrative apparatus. Vague administrative goals must
be clarified. Even articulate administrative goals and planning mecha-
nisms must now incorporate a new sensitivity to Grutter's strict scrutiny
requirements.
102 Id. at 9.
103 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
104 COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44, at 40.
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2. Record-building Requirements
Grutter also incentivized extensive record-keeping. The Grutter
Court admonished schools to engage in "periodic reviews to determine
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body di-
versity."' 05 Compliance manuals have expanded on this requirement:
administrators should "periodically evaluate their programs to ensure
continued compelling interests and the implementation of appropriate
race- or ethnicity-conscious strategies advancing those interests; and they
must make changes when necessary (for instance, as institutional goals
change or as evidence indicates that policies are not having the desired
effect)."106
According to Admissions and Diversity, schools should first identify
"what policies and programs are diversity-related and subject to strict
scrutiny."' 107 The process is not an abstract one. Rather, schools are ad-
vised to dig deep into their archives to "identify individuals involved in
[the] development [of diversity-conscious policies] and locate copies of
documents related to the establishment and implementation of those poli-
cies after their adoption."108
Admissions and Diversity further directs schools to review their
overarching admissions practices. Schools are counseled to establish a
''process ... by which the actual implementation of admissions practices
can be evaluated, after the fact, with respect to policy statements and
legal issues of concern (such as ensuring legitimate individualized re-
view, authentic consideration of multiple diversity factors, and appropri-
ate weighing of race and ethnicity in that process)."109 A school should
be in the position to show that it has an ongoing policy of evaluating its
admissions practices to ensure they are both effective and compliant." 10
Schools are further advised to document their reasons for adopting
specific diversity-conscious goals. According to Admissions and Diver-
sity, schools that adopt a critical mass objective must document the "mul-
tiple evidentiary bases" that justify it.11 Those bases include both
general social science evidence that "defines the critical mass theory and
explains its potential application" as well as
institution-specific research that provides educational
perspectives about critical mass, which may include
statements from professors describing in multiple set-
105 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
106 COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44, at 9.
107 Id. at 14.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 31.
110 Id.
'I' Id. at40.
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tings the points at which they have observed and exper-
ienced the attainment of the educational benefits
associated with a critical mass of minority students.'12
Admissions and Diversity also advises schools to extensively docu-
ment reasons why race-neutral alternatives are not sufficient to achieve
their diversity goals.' 3
In sum, academic deference is not a license for administrators to run
wild, but rather a roster of requirements for schools that choose diversity,
building an atmosphere of self-regulation.
B. THE COLORBLIND EFFECTS OF STRICT SCRUTINY WITH ACADEMIC
DEFERENCE
Grutter did not change the fact that every diversity-conscious ad-
missions program will trigger strict scrutiny. Whether the court will
grant deference has been interpreted to be a question of fact. To be suc-
cessful in court, a school should be able to document its underlying com-
mitment to colorblindness despite the temporary, limited use of racial
classifications.
Strict scrutiny has strong ties to colorblind ideology. The two
merged formally in the Court's decisions in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co. 114 and Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,'1 5 which held that
all racial classifications, even well-intentioned ones, are subject to strict
scrutiny. According to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson, strict
scrutiny is not reserved for invidious racial classification; it is also trig-
gered by "benign" categorizations: "Absent searching judicial inquiry
into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no
way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics." 16 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Scalia further tightened the link between strict scrutiny and colorblind
ideology. 1 7 Scalia wrote that he "shared the view expressed by Alexan-
der Bickel that '[t]he lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court
and the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at least a
generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, uncon-
stitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society.' "118
112 Id.
113 Id. at 49-53.
114 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
115 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
116 Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
117 Id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Given this tight link between strict scrutiny and colorblindness, di-
versity-conscious programs that flaunt race consciousness are not likely
to do well. Not surprisingly, compliance manuals emphasize the link
when they remind administrators of the rigors of strict scrutiny. For in-
stance, the authors of Admissions and Diversity discuss the strict scrutiny
standard in an extensive four page section titled, "The Law Matters."119
The section begins:
[I]t is . . . important to remember that institutions act at
their peril if they do not heed the lessons of the Michi-
gan cases and other federal law .. . . [I]t is clear that
race- and ethnicity-conscious admissions policies must
satisfy 'strict scrutiny' standards in order to withstand
any legal attack. 120
Receiving deference is possible if a school can demonstrate that it
has investigated race neutral alternatives. 12' The Grutter Court advised
administrators to "draw on the most promising aspects of ... race-neutral
alternatives as they develop." 122 The authors of Admissions and Diver-
sity interpreted this as a mandate for administrators to pursue race-neutral
objectives and "regularly review their race- and ethnicity-conscious poli-
cies to determine whether the use of race or ethnicity continues to be
necessary and, if necessary, if the policies merit refinement in light of
relevant institutional developments."' 23 One specific method suggested
is to create a committee that explores race-neutral policies and makes
recommendations.' 24 Specifically, this committee would:
[P]eriodically research . . . and evaluat[e] race-neutral
alternatives . . . [maintain] a record of practices ... along
with the accompanying evaluations regarding their via-
bility ... [and document] the entire array of race-neutral
practices pursued by the institution [by maintaining] an
ongoing record of research regarding the effectiveness of
those practices in achieving institutional diversity
goals. ' 25
The record should document "a pattern that reflects serious consid-
eration, experimentation, and evaluation leading to research-based policy
changes."' 126 This pattern "is more likely to reflect the kind of deliberate
119 See COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44, at 5-8.
120 Id. at 5.
121 See id. at 9, 50.
122 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
123 COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44, at 50.
124 See id. at 53.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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and earnest consideration of alternatives that may justify some federal
court deference to academic judgments regarding race-neutral
alternatives." 127
Receiving deference also appears to be tied to a school's ability to
demonstrate that the diversity-conscious policy is a temporary deviation
from an ideal of colorblindness. 128 The Court praised Michigan's posi-
tion that it "would 'like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admis-
sions formula' and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program
as soon as practicable."' 129 The Court emphasized its "expect[ation] that
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be neces-
sary to further the interest approved today."' 30 Schools are advised to
show that their policies are a necessary, temporary evil. 13' The authors
of Admissions and Diversity state: "Race- and ethnicity-conscious pro-
grams cannot be designed to continue forever."' 32 The authors counsel
schools to administer "an appropriately resourced process of rigorous,
periodic review of race- and ethnicity-conscious policies."' 133 If the
schools do not engage in this process, diversity-conscious programs face
a "substantially greater risk of successful legal challenge."' 34
Judicial deference to academic judgment is one possible way to
avoid strict scrutiny's fatality, but it does not neutralize strict scrutiny's
ideology of colorblindness. Rather, in many ways, deference is condi-
tioned on a school's ability to show its colorblind commitments despite
the use of racial classifications.
IV. ADMINISTERING INDIVIDUALIZED REVIEW
In 1966, B. Alden Thresher, Emeritus Director of Admissions at
MIT, famously described the college admissions process as "the great
sorting." 135 He called it a "social process of great complexity, not fully
understood by the students themselves, by their parents and advisers, or
by the educators, including admissions officers, who participate in it."136
Both the supporters and critics of Grutter agreed that the decision
would fundamentally change the sorting methods. For Grutter's support-
127 Id.
128 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
129 Id. at 343 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 34, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241) ("The Law School has studied this issue for many years, and would like
nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula that would produce meaningful
diversity without doing unacceptable damage to its other educational goals.")).
130 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
131 Id. at 342.
132 COLEMAN & PALMER, supra note 44, at 19.
133 Id. at 9.
134 Id.
135 B. ALDEN THRESHER, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (1966).
136 Id.
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ers, the decision authorized a departure from numerical measures of abil-
ity and from racial quotas. Professor Monique Lillard wrote,
"The thing that is clearest about Grutter is ...chiefly,
highly individualized decision-making as to each indi-
vidual candidate. . . . What the law school presented
was decision-making that Justice O'Connor was pre-
pared to acknowledge was individualized, quite non-
standardized, quite subjective, and very non-quantita-
tive ... which is an ideal of purely individualized non-
stereotyped decision-making."1 37
The authors of the Harvard Civil Rights Project stated that the deci-
sion "reinforce[s] the importance of flexible and holistic admissions poli-
cies that employ a limited use of race." 138 Detractors, too, viewed the
decision as permitting more discretion for selecting students, though they
characterized it less favorably. They argued that the case represents a
leap into the subjective, the irrational, and the emotional. For instance,
according to Professor Joel Goldstein, under Grutter "[i]ndividual admis-
sions officers might pursue their own agendas and consider race to the
exclusion of other forms of diversity."' 139
As discussed above, however, the process of individualized review
outlined by the Court provided no guarantee against mechanization. Fur-
ther, as administrators put individualized review into practice, they have
turned toward a more standardized, rather than a more humanized, pro-
cess. This standardization is carried out in a way that reinforces color-
blind ideology.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF THE FILE, GENERALLY
Extensive document accumulation was a staple of the admissions
process well before the Grutter decision. As the Grutter Court recog-
nized, the primary element of an admissions model is the applicant
file. 140 At minimum, the undergraduate admissions file includes a basic
application with the applicant's background, a high school transcript, and
standardized test results. 14' In addition, institutions often collect coun-
137 Monique C. Lillard et al., The Effect of the University of Michigan Cases on Affirma-
tive Action in Employment: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Meeting, Association of American
Law Schools, Sections on Employment Discrimination Law, Labor Relations and Employment
Law, and Minority Groups, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 127, 129 (2004).
138 THE HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 2 (2003).
139 See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratz and the Promise of Brown,
48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 899, 931-32 (2004).
140 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003).
141 See GRETCHEN W. RIGOL, ADMISSIONS DECISION-MAKING MODELS: How U.S. INSTI-
TUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION SELECT UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS 13 (2003).
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selor recommendations, teacher recommendations, essays or personal
statements, lists of activities and achievements, additional test scores, in-
terview reports, and information about the applicant's high school. 142
Application files for the University of Michigan Law School contained
similar information and documents. 143
Standardization is the rule even for the organization of records
within the file. Some offices have "detailed lists of the order in which
the material is to appear in the file. This... approach has the advantage
of assuring that each reviewer approaches each applicant from a particu-
lar perspective."' 44 Although file organization varies from institution to
institution, common first pages of the file are the actual application, the
transcript, or the personal statement. 145
GPAs are also standardized. Many undergraduate institutions recal-
culate a high school student's GPA because high school calculation
methods vary widely.' 46 Some recalculation formulas accord extra
weight to Advanced Placement ("AP") courses while others do not. 147
Whatever the approach, it must be applied consistently. 148 The standard-
ized GPA is then often added with other elements such as class rank and
test results to compute an academic index. 149 Compilation of this data
helps formalize the individual candidates, allowing institutions to gauge
a candidate's individual aptitude and to comparatively "evaluate all ap-
plicants on a similar basis." 150
There is even discussion of standardizing faculty recommendations
for students applying to graduate school. 151 The Educational Testing
Service ("ETS") surveyed graduate schools about characteristics they
sought in candidates.1 52 The survey produced twenty to thirty character-
istics (both cognitive and noncognitive) that served as the basis for a
patented prototype of an electronic recommendation form. 15 3 The form
rates candidates according to cognitive ability, motivation, and ability to
work with others. 154 The College Board supports this move, declaring
142 See id.
143 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 314-15.
144 RIGOL, supra note 141, at 14.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 See id. at 15.
149 See id.
150 Id.
151 See GRETCHEN W. RIGOL, SELECTION THROUGH INDIVIDUALIZED REVIEW: A REPORT
ON PHASE IV OF THE ADMISSIONS MODELS PROJECT 12 (2004).
152 Id. at 12.
153 Id. at 12-13.
154 Id. at 13.
COLOR ME COLORBLIND
that this "timely research holds promise for making it easier for counsel-
ors and faculty to provide standardized assessments of applicants."' 155
In sum, even before Grutter doctrinalized individualized review, the
exercise of compiling the file was an exercise in standardization.
B. EXAMPLES OF INDIVIDUALIZED REVIEW
Grutter's individualized review requirement is not the antithesis,
but rather the intensification of standardization. A synonym for individ-
ualized review is "whole file review."' 56 In a whole file review, admis-
sions committees examine all the documents included in the applicant's
file. 157 Thus, individualized review does not prevent candidates and
their qualities from being translated into files; rather it ensures that more
candidates and more qualities are so translated. According to one admis-
sions dean, "Whole-file review means just that, not full-life review."' 158
The "getting-to-know-you" process of individualized review occurs
over the course of minutes, not hours or days, and application readers are
valued for their efficiency.159 On average, a reader will spend between
fifteen and twenty minutes on a file with one or more essays and recom-
mendations.1 60 Schools value readers with experience and who can pro-
cess a file quickly. "[E]xperienced readers are extremely familiar with
all components of the application, and they know where to look for spe-
cific information and can quickly identify unusual or outstanding fac-
tors."' 161 The best readers learn to look for and evaluate difference
efficiently because of familiarity with the file format.
Although individualized review varies from school to school, the
standardizing effects of the process do not appear to have been meaning-
fully challenged. The College Board report, Selection through Individu-
alized Review (hereinafter Individualized Review), details five types of
individualized review based on practices at selective institutions. 162
Most of these types are highly structured, using methods like
"buddy systems"' 63 to standardize qualitative judgment calls. At one
highly competitive university, a two-person team reads each file. 164
First, each reader sub-rates an application on three weighted axes: aca-
155 See id. at 13.
156 See id. at 1-2.
157 See id. at 3.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 17.
160 See id. at 23-24 (explaining that the process may take longer if the reader is new).
161 Id. at 24.
162 The report indicates that similar approaches are employed at less competitive colleges
as well. See id. at 4.
163 Id. at 17.
164 See id.
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demics (60%); communication (based upon the applicant's essays, short
answer responses, and teacher and counselor comments) (20%); and
character, leadership, and initiative (20%).165 The subratings serve as
guidelines for assigning an overall rating on a scale of 1 to 5, with a
score of 1 being the highest. 166 This flexibility, however, is limited by
replication requirements. If a reader and her buddy reach the same rat-
ing, review of the file is complete. 167 Files assigned a score of I or 2 are
admitted, files with a score of 3 are held until the process is completed,
files with a score of 4 are waitlisted or denied, and files with a score of 5
are denied. 168 If the two readers disagree, however, a dean, director, or
senior associate reviews the file for a final rating. 169
Another competitive school employs an even more structured buddy
system. Three readers review each application, and each of the readers
rate academics and personal qualities on a more "highly structured" nine-
point scale that includes both academics and "personal qualities."' 170 Ac-
cording to Gretchen W. Rigol of the College Board, "the process is both
thorough and efficient, and an emphasis is placed on training to assure
fairness and consistency."' 171 This school does not use a committee to
make decisions "in part because of a concern that the dynamics of the
committee can be unpredictable."' 72 Committees are viewed as unpre-
dictable and less objective, and the school sharply limits its discretion.
Complex numeric rating systems are often combined with buddy
systems to further control discretion. One highly competitive university
assigns three different ratings-for personal achievement, life chal-
lenges, and academics-and combines those ratings on a "decision
grid."'173 Applicants with exceptionally high academic ratings are gener-
ally accepted regardless of their scores on the other components. Admin-
istrators then focus on borderline applications, which are "reread to
verify the ratings, since a single number could make the difference be-
tween acceptance and denial."' 174 The numeric scoring is subject to in-
tense quality control. "There is an extensive training program, and all
readers must be certified. In addition, readers are constantly monitored
to assure consistency."' 175
165 See id. at 4.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 4-5.
168 See id. at 5.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 6.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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An even more structured rating system uses computer generated ac-
ademic achievement indexes based on the student's class rank and test
scores. Readers index "personal achievement" using a "holistic review
of the entire application, including two essays."' 176 While holistic review
might sound very flexible, the school limits discretion by intensively
training readers. Readers are trained by a faculty member experienced in
the specific type of holistic review used to grade AP exams and the writ-
ing section of the SAT. 177
The most discretionary review style employs a "committee model"
in which a committee discusses and votes on each applicant. 78 The
committee model is nevertheless front-loaded with standardization.
Readers first evaluate applications based on the transcript, test scores,
teacher evaluations, and school recommendation. 179 Readers then re-
view the student's life experience and "other competitive factors that dis-
tinguish the applicant."' 80 The full admissions committee does not make
any decisions until after readers process the files and compile summa-
ries.' 81 Moreover, even under this most discretionary approach, subjec-
tivity is checked by potentially coercive boardroom dynamics: at least a
majority must approve the applicant's admission. 182 The College Board
approves of this model in part "because of the belief that any personal
biases that one committee member might have are offset by others on the
committee."183 Thus, one of the acknowledged goals of using a commit-
tee is to use board members to correct for the irrational biases of the
others. Here, then, the committee is an objective, predictable mechanism
for correcting individual discretion.
Therefore, although individualized review or whole file review
sounds like a process that humanizes the standardization of the file, in
practice, discretion is controlled by formalizing mechanisms such as
buddy systems, intense numeric scoring techniques, and committee
politics.
C. TRAINING AND MONITORING OF READERS
Even admissions policies that leave room for discretion try to ensure
that readers employ that discretion in a trained way. Training tools in-
clude official definitions of desirable qualities and "range-finder" appli-
176 Id. at 7.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 5.
179 Id.
18o Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 6.
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cations to keep readers in sync.' 84 Discretion is thus extensively
calibrated by training and monitoring of readers.' 85
Specific definitions of desirable qualities are commonly used to
help readers select the best applicants. Sometimes, readers use defini-
tions as general, non-binding guideposts. In other cases, readers must
determine how each applicant scores for each defined characteristic. For
example, an application process might require the reader to rate an es-
say's spelling, depth of vocabulary, sentence structure, organization, and
originality, and then combine the totals of each category to compute a
total score. 18
6
"Range finders," or sample files, are another common method for
standardizing discretion. Range finder files are applications "that have
been 'normed' by experienced readers."' 87 The range finder method
might use several sample files for each point on a five-point rating scale.
For example, trainers might provide sample files in the "1" and "2"
ranges so that readers can learn the difference. Smaller institutions might
develop the sample cases as a training exercise, while larger institutions
often extensively develop collections of "norming files" prior to
training. 188
Every individualized review program studied by the College Board
required reader training. 189 Training ranged from an informal buddy sys-
tem that paired new and experienced readers to intensive one-week pro-
grams that included "hands-on training, homework, and eventual
certification."'' 90 In general, training programs introduce readers to the
types of students and specific qualities sought by the institution, familiar-
ize readers with the school's rating scale, and provide readers with exam-
ples of files from past years. A school may require only one training
period, or it may have ongoing training throughout the evaluation period
to keep readers calibrated. 191 Many schools use calibration sessions, in
which readers review the same group of files and then discuss how their
ratings diverged. 92 Calibration sessions can involve the entire group or
a subset of the group, and they can convene as often as weekly. 93
Training programs are intense. For example, one medium-sized
university uses ten experienced admissions staff and five part-time
184 Id. at 19.
185 Id. at 17.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 19.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 17.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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outside readers. 194 Everyone must attend training during the annual staff
retreat, even veteran readers. 195 At the retreat, readers review detailed
class profiles of the past five years, scoring guidelines, and sample files
representing a range of applications received the year before. 196 "This
training occurs before the fall school-visiting season in order to assure
that admissions staff recruit the types of students the institution wishes to
admit." 197
A second, larger school employs a four-step training process. First,
evaluators read or reread written training materials. Readers then must
attend a three-hour overview of the process. Third, readers score twenty
files as homework. Finally, readers must attend a group "norming ses-
sion" with twelve to fifteen people in each group. 198 "If a reader rates all
files appropriately during the first set, they are 'certified.' Readers may
continue with two additional sets until they are either certified or disqual-
ified from reading."' 99 Thus, schools check and recheck readers to en-
sure that their discretion is in step with the school's norms. Only those
readers who successfully complete the program are certified and permit-
ted to review actual applications.200
In addition to pre-fall training, some institutions regularly monitor
inter-reader reliability after the application process has begun.20' One
school monitors readers by preparing weekly reports for each reader that
include "the number of files read, the number of times a reader agreed
with a second reader, and the number of readings that resulted in a third
review (when ratings were more than one point apart). '202 Another insti-
tution requires experienced readers to "shadow" new readers to ensure
they are applying the guidelines properly. 20 3 The College Board reports
that within most institutions, "agreement among readers ranges from 90
to 97 percent. If there are particular readers who are frequently out of
sync with the others, additional training is provided. °20 4
Another strategy for ensuring consistency includes measuring the
deviation between two readers and using a third reader if the first two
readings deviate by 0.5 to 1 point.20 5 Other institutions use "experienced
194 Id. at 20.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 21.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
20081
546 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:515
team leaders who review and confirm all final decisions. '20 6 Yet another
approach recycles files randomly throughout the reading process or even
to the same reader, to ensure that ratings are the same the second time.207
Schools use exceedingly structured individualized review policies
and rigorously train the people who read the files. Far from humanizing
the application process with discretion or individualizing it by taking into
account applicants' unique characteristics, individualized review further
standardizes it.
D. How INDIVIDUALIZED REVIEW FUNCTIONS AS COLORBLINDNESS
Standardized individualized review procedures reinforce colorblind-
ness in two ways. First, they legitimate the ideal of a colorblind mer-
itocracy. Consideration of personal statements and other soft variables
paradoxically strengthens meritocracy, because individualized review
still prioritizes merit as the primary determinant of an applicants' for-
tune. Subjective or qualitative characteristics continue to play supporting
roles. The perception that schools consider subjective qualities creates
an appearance of going beyond the numbers while also ensuring that the
numbers remain a large part of most decisions. Second, individualized
review uses the diversity standard for evaluation of soft variables. The
diversity standard is itself colorblind.
1. The Diversity Standard Ratifies Colorblind Meritocracy
The critique of merit, raised frequently by Critical Race Theorists,
focuses on the false dichotomy between merit and race consciousness. 208
Dispelling that false dichotomy means "challeng[ing] the objectivity of
the category of merit by viewing it in terms of the particular social prac-
tices by which whites historically distributed social goods. ' 209 The cri-
tique has roots that stretch back decades. 2 10 For instance, during the
1965-66 school year, the Yale undergraduate admissions office-in lan-
guage perhaps more palatable at that time-adopted a policy that "seri-
ously consider[ed] the possibility that SAT scores might reflect cultural
deprivation rather than lack of intelligence." 21
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Mar Matsuda, Who is Excellent?, I SEATrLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 29, 30-31
(2002) ("[S]tudents are taught that there are two boxes. One is labeled excellent, the best,
academic standards. The other is labeled Black, brown, woman, affirmative action, compro-
mise .... [A student] somehow learn[s] that a Black woman could not possibly be the best
person to teach him what he needs to know.").
209 Peller, supra note 8, at 806-07.
210 JEROME KARABEL, THE CHOSEN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF EXCLUSION AT HARVARD,
YALE, AND PRINCETON 383-84 (2005).
211 Id. at 384.
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Today, the critique of merit is widespread. Scholars continue to
argue that racial disparities in test scores, while fluctuating over the
years, remain significant today.2 12 Susan Sturm and Lani Guinier cast
doubt on the ability of the SAT to assess merit. They noted that the SAT
better predicts parental income than first-year grades. 2 13 "The linkage
between test performance and parental income is consistent and strik-
ing. . . . [The] correlation between income level and test performance
persists within every racial and ethnic group. '21 4 In a landmark study of
affirmative action in higher education, William Bowen and Derek Bok
found a "marked disparity in test scores between black and white appli-
cants. ' '21 5 This critique, however, has not diminished the SAT's impor-
tance. Along with high school GPA, the SAT score is one of the two
most important means for evaluating applicants. 216
In the law school context, many of the briefs filed with the Supreme
Court in Grutter challenged the plaintiff's presumption that standardized
tests objectively measure merit.2 17 The LSAT is required for admission
to all ABA approved law schools (and many non-ABA approved law
212 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 5, at 19.
213 Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Inno-
vative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 988-89 (1996).
214 Id. (citing raw data provided by the College Entrance Examination Board). For more
critiques of the SAT, see generally JAMES CROUSE & DALE TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE
SAT (1988).
215 Id.
216 NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET OF HISTORY OF AMERICAN MER-
ITOCRACY 155-56 (1999); see also William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates
"Built-In Headwinds": An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 131 (2002) (citing GEORGE H. HANFORD, LIFE WITH THE SAT: ASSESSING OUR
YOUNG PEOPLE AND OUR TIMES 90 (1991) (characterizing the SAT as the gatekeeper of higher
education)) (stating that, according to former College Board President George Hanford, "the
SAT served as the most widely used and possibly the most important single talent search
device the country had").
217 See, e.g., Brief for a Committee of Concerned Black Graduates of ABA Accredited
Law Schools as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Brief for Concerned Black Graduates] ("[T]he record in this
case demonstrates that traditional admissions criteria are in fact flawed. These measures are
not reliable predictors of academic merit or performance after graduation for all candidates.
The student intervenors in this case directly challenged Petitioner's presumption that standard-
ized tests constitute objective measures of merit, and that affirmative action necessarily
amounts to a preference for "lesser qualified" students of color. They presented evidence that
heavy reliance on standardized aptitude test scores constitute built-in racial preferences for
White applicants."); Brief of Massachusetts Institute of Technology et al. Supporting Respon-
dents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief for the National Center
for Fair & Open Testing (Fairtest) as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) ("[T]he SAT and LSAT are not neutral, objective
measures of 'merit' .... ").
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schools) 218 even though racial disparities in LSAT scores219 and ques-
tions about the LSAT's predictive capabilities 22 0 have generated criti-
cism similar to that leveled against the SAT. One brief argued, "[T]he
record in this case demonstrates that traditional admissions criteria are in
fact flawed. These measures are not reliable predictors of academic
merit or performance after graduation for all candidates .... [The record
demonstrates that] heavy reliance on standardized aptitude test scores
constitutes built-in racial preferences for White applicants." 221
Despite these attacks, standardized tests continue to play a promi-
nent role in the admissions process, even after Grutter. As noted above,
the individualized review process frequently considers merit and diver-
sity separately and then balances them, with merit receiving more
weight.222 The fact that there is a balancing process tends to deem-
phasize the higher weight accorded to merit or academics. For instance,
one school studied by the College Board advised readers to weight aca-
demics at 60%, communication at 20%, and character at 20%.223 Diver-
sity does not even warrant a category of its own; presumably it is
considered a subset of "character, leadership, and initiative" along with
athletics, community service, and participation in student government. 224
Diversity is thus limited to some portion of 20%; academics are privi-
leged with 60%. This balancing method affirms the meritocratic, indi-
vidualist values within the rhetoric of race-consciousness.
Rather than resisting the values of colorblind meritocracy, individu-
alized review carefully preserves and ratifies them. The rhetoric of di-
versity criteria has obscured the substantial weight still accorded to
colorblind academics. Actual assessment of a candidate's diversity con-
tribution is confined to the diversity-or, more broadly, character-seg-
218 Law School Admission Council, About the LSAT, http://www.lsac.org/LSAT/about-
the-lsat.asp (last visited May 5, 2008) ("The Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is a half-
day standardized test required for admission to LSAC-member law schools, most Canadian
law schools, and many non-ABA-approved law schools.").
219 See, e.g., William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving 'Elite' College Stu-
dents, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2001) (arguing that racial and ethnic gaps in LSAT scores
are larger than those in undergraduate grades, law school grades, or later success in the legal
profession).
220 See Brief for Concerned Black Graduates, supra note 217, at 4; LANI GUINtR ET AL.,
BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTrruTiONAL CHANGE 38-41 (1997)
(arguing that LSAT scores explain at most twenty-one percent of the variance in law school
grades for all students by the third year of law school and even less for the first two years); see
also Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential
Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11
HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 1 (1994).
221 Brief for Concerned Black Graduates, supra note 217, at 4.
222 RIGOL, supra note 141, at 4.
223 Id.
224 Id.
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ment of the application. The next section will examine how
colorblindness is reinscribed even there.
2. The Diversity Standard Is Itself Colorblind
In addition to ratifying the weight given meritocratic categories over
diversity, the diversity standard also re-deploys colorblind values within
the race-conscious assessment. Even when diversity is being evaluated
openly, the individualist strand of race consciousness, which treats race
as a "voluntary, willed association," 225 triumphs over the group-subordi-
nation analysis, which posits that "power determine[s] the distribution of
social resources and opportunities, rather than reason or merit. ' 226 Di-
versity individualizes racial difference in a way that obscures group
power and subordination.
The Grutter Court emphasized that diversity must be a measure that
would capture and benefit all students.227 As discussed above, the Court
affirmed the diversity rationale precisely because of its capacity to trans-
late all applicants into neutral terms and then identify relational devia-
tions from those terms.228 Quoting Justice Powell, the Court held that
"an admissions program must be 'flexible enough to consider all perti-
nent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, al-
though not necessarily according them the same weight.' "229 Thus, the
Court translated racial categories into a diversity standard, making racial
diversity interchangeable with speaking several languages or traveling
abroad:
[T]he Law School seriously weighs many other diversity
factors besides race that can make a real and dispositive
difference for nonminority applicants as well . . . [be-
cause it] sufficiently takes into account, in practice as
well as in theory, a wide variety of characteristics be-
sides race and ethnicity that contribute to a diverse stu-
dent body.230
Through the concept of diversity, the Court deployed the integra-
tionist move of stripping from race its context, history, power, and
politics.
225 Peller, supra note 8, at 794.
226 Id. at 790.
227 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334, 337 (2003).
228 Id. at 334, 337.
229 Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring)) (emphasis added).
230 Id. at 338-39.
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In June 2007, the Court reiterated that the constitutionality of racial
considerations hinges upon its translation into individualized diversity.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, the Court wrote,
The entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the
admissions program at issue there focused on each appli-
cant as an individual, and not simply as a member of a
particular racial group.... The point of the narrow tai-
loring analysis . . .was to ensure that the use of racial
classifications was indeed part of a broader assessment
of diversity. 231
That is, difference cannot be constitutionally considered unless eve-
ryone has access to it. The category of difference cannot exclude
anyone.
Grutter's race-conscious depoliticization of race, therefore, sounds
quite similar to the colorblind integrationists' use of neutrality. Diversity
reenacts the integrationist practice of identifying "'neutral' social prac-
tices from which to identify bias and deviation [and] constitute[ ] a whole
realm of institutional characteristics removed from critical view. '232 Di-
versity renders race a neutral social practice by interchanging it with
travel, family hardship, or community service. Bias and deviation is
measured by one's diversity capacity, and the personalization of race as
individual experience isolates it from a political context or critique.
In complying with Grutter, administrators individualize race to the
point where even a white person can join in. One post-Grutter compli-
ance manual provides this hypothetical:
Applicant A belongs to an underrepresented minority
group, comes from a middle class family, and has aver-
age grades and test scores. She is a solid, but unremark-
able candidate. Applicant B has poorer grades and test
scores, but comes from a disadvantaged background and
is an accomplished jazz saxophonist. She is White. A
reviewer may decide to admit Applicant B over Appli-
cant A because Applicant B will contribute more to the
diversity of the student body than Applicant A. 233
While some radical redistributivists might support an ultimate out-
come that admits the disadvantaged Applicant B, race-conscious redis-
231 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753 (2007) (citations omitted).
232 Peller, supra note 8, at 779.
233 BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP ET AL., PRESERVING DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A
MANUAL ON ADMISSIONS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AFTER THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
DECISIONS 30 (2004).
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tributivists might critique the way the manual (and those who use it)
reduces an applicant's race to an individualized circumstance like jazz
saxophone playing. The manual tritely attempts to disassociate saxo-
phone playing and disadvantaged backgrounds with blackness and aver-
ageness with whiteness.2 34 It assumes that disadvantaged backgrounds
and test scores are as randomly, apolitically, and individually distributed
as skin color and saxophone talent. 235
In sum, while diversity appears to give administrators the freedom
to embrace race consciousness, it actually reinscribes within race con-
sciousness the colorblind practice of translating race into neutral, apoliti-
cal, individual characteristics.
E. CONCLUSION
This section has argued that, like deference, the discretion permitted
by individualized review is not administrative anarchy. Both structural
and disciplinary mechanisms inhibit the thoughtful, engaging, subjective
exercise or review imagined by Grutter's supporters. Individualized re-
view-with its multi-tiered review processes, demands for efficiency,
and extensive training programs-has intensified the practice of stan-
dardizing applicants. Further, explicit diversity considerations comprise
a relatively small portion of the file, and that portion reinforces color-
blindness by ratifying meritocracy and individualizing race.
V. PERSONAL STATEMENTS: PRODUCING THE BOTTOM
AND REPRODUCING COLORBLINDNESS
Can students save individualized review? Administrators praise
personal statements as the best, and sometimes the only, way to get to
know the student.236 For students, essays are commonly considered an
opportunity to control their destinies, to write about the thing about
which they are most knowledgeable, and to reflect on turning points or
obstacles overcome in their own lives. Personal statements supplement
the examination-like qualities of GPAs and standardized test scores.
They ratify the truth of the entire file by providing administrators with an
additional truth-telling device. Under this view, personal statements are
authentic, empowering, and unique.
Given the personal statement's link with individual authenticity, it
appears to be the perfect method for making race conscious admissions a
reality. Grutter's permission to consider racial experiences disclosed in
personal statements seems to heed Professor Matsuda's call to "look to
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 ERIc OWENS, LAW SCHOOL ESSAYS THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE 17 (2d ed. 2006).
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the bottom" and tap the "concrete experience of oppression" to examine
"right and wrong, justice and injustice. '237 Under this theory, the per-
sonal statement can provide an experiential starting point from which we
can build an understanding of race and racism from the ground up. De-
fenders of Grutter might argue that personal statements could range from
the colorblind to the race-conscious ideologies, and that such a range
might be precisely what administrators seek.
The access to racial insights from personal statements looks to be
substantial. Students are urged to detail their racial experiences so that
administrators can make fully-informed admissions decisions. Accord-
ing to one coaching manual,
Sometimes applicants want to . . . say, for example, "I
am an Asian American from Missouri." Expressed in
such a general way, your background provides almost no
insight into your character. If you choose to talk about
your background in the context of how it has shaped
your perspective and influenced your choices, that's a
different story. If you go this route, however, remember
to be highly specific; you do not want to be thought of as
an applicant who was trying to fit into a preconceived
notion of identity.238
It appears, then, that a critical purpose of the personal statement,
sanctioned by Grutter, is to learn much more about the authentic, indi-
vidual experiences of students of color. By elaborating on how her back-
ground influenced her life, an applicant can inform both admissions
officers and, later, her peers in class, about the complexities and banali-
ties, triumphs and disadvantages, of living a racialized life.
A review of actual personal statements, however, indicates that
these essays are not rife with authentic, highly differentiated statements
from the bottom of our diverse society.239 Rather, they are highly stan-
dardized, and they articulate the colorblind values underlying Grutter
and the administrative processes discussed above. Like the Court and the
admissions policies, personal statements have effectively reinscribed col-
orblindness within race consciousness. Operating together, Courts, ad-
ministrators, and students are producing a type of racial knowledge
called diversity that, on the surface, openly acknowledges group-based
237 Matsuda, supra note 32, at 63.
238 OWENS, supra note 236, at 17.
239 Given the confidentiality requirements of the Family Educational and Privacy Rights
Act, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2002), and the reluctance of students to share their per-
sonal statements directly with me, this section relies upon personal statements published by
coaching manuals. These statements therefore serve the dual, perhaps contradictory, purposes
of being both authentic and models. They also illustrate a further trend toward standardization.
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race consciousness but, when digging deeper, reaffirms individualist val-
ues of colorblindness.
Comparing personal statements with the similar literary genre of the
Roman Catholic confession sheds light on how personal statements cre-
ate this particular type of racial knowledge. The confession is an apt
analogy because it is also presumed to be authentic, empowering, and
individualized, though the opposite is frequently true. As discussed be-
low, the power relationship between the priest and the penitent, and the
extensive literature on how to give a good-and avoid a bad-confes-
sion, undermine the notion that confessions liberate one's authentic soul.
After reviewing this critique of the Roman Catholic confession, this
section will apply it to the personal statement. It argues the power rela-
tionship between applicant and admissions officer, and the literature
about what constitutes an excellent essay, undercuts the presumption that
personal statements can challenge colorblindness.
The final section of this part analyzes one way that the racial knowl-
edge of diversity standardizes both white applicants and applicants of
color. I argue that the colorblindness within the diversity standard, dis-
cussed above, incentivizes students to portray themselves as different but
not too different. In other words, because diversity can be racial but can
also be any other extracurricular activity, applicants must distinguish
themselves without marking themselves as permanently different. Gen-
erally, this exerts on white students a desire to differentiate themselves
from what they consider mainstream white culture, while students of
color often try to demonstrate how race is not a permanent situation, but
rather a set of insights accessible to anyone.
A. ONE CRITIQUE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CONFESSION
In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church forged a strong link be-
tween truth and confession. In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council re-
quired every Christian to confess to a priest.2 40 In the centuries that
followed, the Church further refined confessional techniques. By the
second half of sixteenth century, for example, confessions had their own
house within the House of God: the confessional box.24 '
Today, we confess to discover the truth about ourselves. We have
inherited from the Church the general idea that confessions are liberating
expressions of a deep, authentic self. Critics, however, have demon-
strated that they often operate as constraining and self-producing, and
Michel Foucault's critique is perhaps the most famous. In The History of
240 THOMAS N. TENTLER, SIN AND CONFESSION ON THE EVE OF THE REFORMATION 16
(1977).
241 Id. at 82.
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Sexuality, he describes how power relationships between a priest and a
penitent undermine both liberating and authenticating beliefs about con-
fession.2 42 Confession, for Foucault, is the production of "men's subjec-
tion: their constitution of subjects in both senses of the word." 243 First,
confessions make individuals "subjects" in the sense that they are domi-
nated by another individual. "[O]ne has to have an inverted image of
power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken for so
long in our civilization-repeating the formidable injunction to tell what
one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgot-
ten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking-are
speaking to us of freedom. ' 244 Second, confessions create their subject,
the penitent. The self truth is produced by power relationships, such as
those between priests and penitents. "[T]ruth is not by nature free....
[I]ts production is thoroughly imbued with relations of power. The con-
fession is an example of this."12 45
Through this compulsory speech act, therefore, a truth is not re-
vealed but rather produced. Truth and power reinforce one another; truth
would not be the truth if it did not have to be forced out. In his book
exploring the link between law, literature, and confession, Yale Professor
of Comparative Literature Peter Brooks discusses the shadow that the
power bond between confessor and confessant casts on "truth. ' 246 As
Brooks writes, "'Truth' is to be sought in those places that have been
marked by censorship. It is not the voluntary confession that interests
the analyst, but the involuntary-that which can be coerced from the
analysis and in the course of analytic work. '2 47 The power bond be-
tween confessor and confessant "contains, and activates, elements of de-
pendency, subjugation, fear, the desire for propitiation, the wish to
appease and the wish to please. It leads to the articulation of secrets,
perhaps to the creation of hitherto unrealized truth-or perhaps the simu-
lacrum of truth. ' 248 Thus, the power relationship between priest and
penitent affects the very truth being revealed and the very self revealing
it.
B. TRUTH AND AUTHENTICITY
If a confession does not simultaneously affirm and explore the self,
then it lacks authenticity. Brooks notes, "Without the sense of the self
242 MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 60 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATURE
53 (2000).
247 Id.
248 Id. at 35.
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and its narrative, there could be no confession; and without the require-
ment of confession, internally or externally mandated, there would be no
exploration of this selfhood. ' '249 I confess, therefore I am. Truth is the
lifeline of self, and it binds self and speech act.
As in religious confessions, the truth is supposed to be at the heart
of the personal statement. Harvard Law School advises applicants that
"candid, forthright, and thoughtful statements are always the most help-
ful. ' ' 250 The University of Michigan's introduction to the personal state-
ment reads:
Each entering class is composed of accomplished people
who bring a spectrum of experiences and perspectives to
our community. Your personal statement provides you
with an opportunity to demonstrate the ways in which
you can contribute your talents and experiences. Suc-
cessful applicants have elaborated on significant per-
sonal, academic, and professional experiences;
meaningful intellectual interests and extracurricular ac-
tivities; factors inspiring them to obtain a legal educa-
tion; and/or significant obstacles, challenges, or
disadvantages met. 25 1
The application to Yale Law School requires two essays.2 5 2 In the
first, applicants may address any subject they wish, but that choice is
considered an indicator of a self-truth: "Faculty readers look to this essay
to get a glimpse of your character, intellectual passions, analytical abili-
ties, and writing skills. The choice of a topic-personal anecdote, an
academic subject, or current events-can be illuminating. ' 253 Yale's in-
troduction to the second essay advises applicants to "highlight aspects of
your background that you believe will be of interest to the Admissions
Committee. We are particularly interested in aspects of your background
that may not be evident from other parts of your application. '254 Appli-
cations routinely conclude with a certification form that applicants must
sign, affirming that all statements are truthful and acknowledging that the
discovery of untruthful information could result in rescission of an ad-
missions offer or other discipline.2 55
249 Id. at 97.
250 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
JURiS DOCTOR PROGRAM 3 (2006-2007).
251 MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, APPLICATION TO Jumis DOCTOR PROGRAM A4 (2006-2007).
252 YALE LAW SCHOOL, STEPS IN APPLYING AS A FIRST-YEAR, http://www.law.yale.edu/
admissions/firstyearapplication.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See, e.g., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 250, at 2.
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In addition to these official prescriptions, a vast literature of coach-
ing manuals offers insider tips that emphasize the importance of provid-
ing a truthful self narrative. One manual, Law School Essays that Made
a Difference, advises, "[T]ell the truth, and find your unique angle. '256 It
continues, "Not only will a unique and interesting essay be more effec-
tive; it will also be far more enjoyable to write. Who are you? Why are
you different?" 2-57 Another manual, Great Personal Statements for Law
School, cautions, "You will hear a lot (in this book too) about 'position-
ing' themes and thinking 'strategically' about your essays, but none of
that will make any difference if you don't first respond in an honest, self-
revealing way to the invitation the personal statement extends to you." 258
Interestingly, both manuals imply that telling the truth is not only strate-
gically important but also an "invitation," something to enjoy. The
manuals downplay the fact that speaking is done in exchange for admis-
sion and instead highlight how writing a personal statement is an impor-
tant, meaningful, even healthy introspective exercise.
An applicant's unique truth is commonly equated with a deep se-
cret. In this genre, the depth of a secret measures the depth of the indi-
vidual; and the fewer people who know, the more likely it is true. Past
successful applicants, whose advice is published in coaching manuals,
emphasize the importance of telling deep truths. One advised, "I believe
the key to an effective personal statement is to be genuine. Don't write
about what you think the admissions board wants to hear. If this is
something you really want, something you truly believe you were meant
to do, it should come easy."'259 Another said, "[T]he best piece of advice
I received was from within.... Your job is to be true to the whispered
calling inside. Those dreams you have of success that you won't dare
share with even your best friend have been born because you can."'260 A
third wrote, "Let your personal statement be a true reflection of who you
are and write it from that perspective. Sit down, soul search and then
begin writing .... Write your personal statement for yourself. You want
this statement to be how you perceive yourself."'261
An undergraduate admissions officer at Duke University discussed
an essay that got her attention because it was written with "a raw honesty
256 OWENS, supra note 236, at 17.
257 Id. at 6, 17.
258 PAUL BODINE, GREAT PERSONAL STATEMENTS FOR LAW SCHOOL 23 (2006).
259 Stephanie M. Brown, Stephanie M. Brown, in PROFILES & ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL
AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS 50, 52 (Evangeline M. Mitchell ed., 2004).
260 Kimberly B. Kirby, Kimberly B. Kirby, in PROFILES & ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL AFRI-
CAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 124, 125.
261 Funmi E. Olorunnipa, Funmi E. Olorunnipa, in PROFILES & ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL
AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 173, 174-75.
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about [a student's] struggles with anorexia. '262 The officer quoted sev-
eral passages from the essay:
I hated the girl in the mirror, I hated her fat chipmunk
cheeks, her rounded forehead, her pug nose. I hated eve-
rything about her and wanted her to go away .... [An-
orexia] is about power and control, it's about dealing-
or not dealing-with issues of sexuality, it's about
perfection and self-hatred. It takes a lot of energy to
hate yourself this much.263
The applicant's statement is actually three layered confessions, each
one seemingly more self-revealing than the last. She is anorexic. Even
more, she confesses that her anorexia is not about food or body con-
sciousness, but is instead a symptom of a deeper psychological pain.
More still, she confesses to one of the deepest psychological ways a per-
son can be sick: she spends every hour of every day hating and destroy-
ing herself. She is unique not just because she is destroying herself, but
also because she knows and confesses that she is destroying herself. She
has had to overcome intense self-destructive obstacles to make that con-
fession. Thus, she exists-both to herself and to the admissions of-
ficer-as a unique individual because she can and does tell this story.
This understanding of self-truth as raw honesty, however, is under-
mined by the many ways penitents and applicants are advised to access
this honesty. In both religious and academic contexts there is a specific
process. According to Thomas N. Tentler, religious confessions have
historically needed foundations in a specific methodology. 264 In an ex-
tensive study of confession, Tentler found that the religious penitent was
expected to soul search in a thorough and organized manner:
[Confession] is to be done methodically, deliberately,
and extensively .... [I]t was not uncommon for an au-
thor to commend a general examination of one's whole
life, and suggest other helps to the recollection of sin
such as review from one's youth to the present of his
various companions, occupations, habitations, ages, and
so on.
2 6 5
Religious confessions, therefore, were not truthful unless they dis-
lodged deep secrets through a methodical examination of the penitent's
personal history and daily life. No detail is too big or too small.
262 RACHEL TOOR, ADMISSIONS CONFIDENTIAL: AN INSIDER'S AccouNT OF THE ELITE
COLLEGE SELECTION PROCESS 116 (2001).
263 Id. at 116-17.
264 See TENTLER, supra note 240, at 109-10.
265 Id. at 110.
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Admissions guidebooks suggest techniques very similar to the cen-
turies-old religious method of "review[ing] from one's youth to the pre-
sent of his various companions, occupations, habitations, ages, and so
on."
'2 6 6 Great Personal Statements for Law School recommends that ap-
plicants "find [their] self-marketing handle," which reflects the "key uni-
queness factors from [their] personal, professional, academic and
community lives. ' 267 Echoing a fifteenth-century religious manual,
which advised a penitent to search his conscience "as if he expected to
find some great treasure there,"2 68 Great Personal Statements for Law
School advises applicants to "data-mine your life."' 269 It cautions, "Your
memory can deceive you .... The goal here is to find different ways to
bypass your inhibitions and trick your mind into disgorging details you
overlooked, significant events you've taken for granted, passions you
forgot you once had."270
Great Personal Statements for Law School suggests several specific
techniques for accessing the sub-conscious. In one technique-"visual
mapping or clustering"- candidates should "jot[ ] down whatever
events, skills, values or interests" are generated by several theme
words.271 "If you go with the flow here you may gain insights into what
you value most and the interconnections between your themes. '272 An-
other exercise involves "let[ting] your mind linger over each section of
the resume, recalling the challenges, breakthroughs, and changes each
stage of your career has offered you .... [T]his exercise can generate
useful material and a timeframe for understanding your development. 273
For the more inhibited applicant, use of a tape recorder is encouraged to
turn on the taps. The applicant can either record herself speaking extem-
poraneously or answer life questions, like "What makes you happiest?"
and "What has been your greatest failure and what have you learned
from it?"274 Stream of consciousness writing will "unwittingly produce
ideas, phrases, and insights that may actually wind up in your essays. 275
Finally, the book advises applicants to use these techniques rou-
tinely for best results. "Nothing will get you into the discipline of writ-
ing better than a daily regimen. The operative word here is daily-
anything less frequent will prevent you from writing naturally and un-
266 Id.
267 ,BODINE, supra note 258, at 7.
268 TENTLER, supra note 240, at 110 (quoting Jean Gerson, Opus Tripartitum).
269 BODINE, supra note 258, at 8.
270 Id. at 9.
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selfconsciously. ' '276 Self-discovery is most effective when practiced reg-
ularly. "The mere act of translating your thoughts into words-in
whatever form-forces those thoughts to the next level of concreteness
and leads you in new directions. 277
The content of the confession is affected not only by the technique
that produces it, but also by the desire that produces it. J.M. Coetzee has
noted, "[C]onfession reveals nothing so much as the helplessness of con-
fession before the desire of the self to construct its own truth.9278 If the
act of confessing is tied up with the desire to construct a self-truth, then
"[w]e are now beyond all questions of sincerity. '279 Each confession
"might yet be not the truth but a self-serving fiction, because the unex-
amined, unexaminable principle behind it may not be a desire for truth
but a desire to be a particular way. '"280
As in the religious context, personal statements cannot reveal a truth
that exists independent of the power relationship that elicits it. At a basic
level, admissions officers are acutely aware that their two-way power
bond with applicants has repercussions for the integrity of truth. Schools
are constantly on guard against plagiarism. One coaching manual asked
administrators at top law schools, "What steps do you take to recognize
and prevent plagiarism? Do you have an institutional policy on plagia-
rism?"'281 Though answers varied, all agreed that it was a problem and
that they had strategies for discovering and disciplining it.282 For exam-
ple, when administrators at UC Berkeley School of Law suspect plagia-
rism-in particular, personal statements downloaded from the internet-
they employ an administrative solution: "We're aware of the sites. We
do have a policy on plagiarism; anytime we see it, we'll report it to the
misconduct committee." At Georgetown University Law Center,
"[p]lagiarism is a recognized threat .... Each application contains the
writing sample from the LSAT exam, so the admissions committee will
be aware if the personal statement reads differently from the applicant's
sample." Michigan is more pro-active, employing a system of "compar-
ing notes": "[W]e will search through other applications and search for
the essays on the Web and in various databases to which we have access.
Every year we uncover a few plagiarists." 2 83
276 Id. at 11.
277 Id.
278 J.M. Coetzee, Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky, 37
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Administrators also watch for fabrication. The College Board notes
that "[a]dmissions officers and the public have become increasingly con-
cerned ... that students might attempt to exaggerate or fabricate infor-
mation in hopes of convincing readers of disadvantages they have had to
overcome." 284 The College Board recommends a "thorough reading of
the entire file" to "identify information that seems out of line. '285 Some
schools have formal verification procedures, such as requiring counselors
to verify specific information, requesting students to verify certain facts,
and calling students at home and speaking with the students' parents if
administrators suspect misrepresentation. 28 6
These concerns about plagiarism and fabrication are minor, how-
ever. The personal statement remains a staple of the application process,
and administrators just prepare to "uncover a few plagiarists" each
year.287 The assumption seems to be that if not fabricated or plagiarized,
a personal statement is truthful and, by extension, the overwhelming ma-
jority of personal statements are true. The process and expectation of
ferreting out liars helps preserve the underlying faith in the truth of per-
sonal statements.
The problem, however, is that all applicants, like all penitents, seek
"the keys.1288 The power of the administrator to grant admission, and
the desire to be admitted, blur the line between confessing a true self and
confessing a wish for the self. In their advice to future applicants, for
example, successful applicants have elided the two concepts in as little as
two sentences. One successful applicant advised, "The admissions com-
mittee is interested in the type of person you are and what you will bring
to the law school community. Therefore, I believe that your personal
statement should give the reader a sense of who you are."'289 The mes-
sage seems to be: give the committee what they want, which also hap-
pens to be "who you are." One Harvard Law graduate said, "Think
about yourself holistically. What are your strengths? What are your
weaknesses? Why should you be the first person accepted into next
year's IL class? What mutually beneficial relationship are you going to
284 RIGOL, supra note 141, at 15.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 OWENS, supra note 236, at 42-43.
288 The priest's power of "the keys" is the power of absolution after confession. See
TENTLER, supra note 240, at 57. The phrase is derived from Matthew 16:19, in which Christ
tells St. Peter, "And I will give thee the keys of the kingdom; and whatever thou shalt bind on
earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."
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have with the school to which you are applying?" 290 Another writes,
"The point of an essay is A) to give the law school their first look at your
writing, but B) more importantly to allow them to understand more about
you. Admissions officers read many applications, and it is of the utmost
importance that you set yourself apart by being genuine and dynamic. '291
All of these statements show slippage from advising students to describe
"who you are" to justifying "why the law school should want you."
Descriptive and desiring selves become further conflated when
coaching manuals tell candidates to "[t]ailor your statement to your
school. '292 Great Personal Statements for Law School devotes three
pages to the subheading "Why Our School? ' 293 It lists four categories of
school-specific information that applicants should address in their per-
sonal statements: "academics, extracurricular features, general and 'cul-
tural' features, and campus visit and personal interaction. '294 Applicants
are thus urged to describe their cultural features in ways that illustrate a
perfect fit with the school's cultural features. In a similar vein, a few
pages after Susan Estrich warns applicants "that the worst thing is a
phony, and you're dealing with people who are in the business of spot-
ting them a mile away," 295 she advises, "Schools are like dates. We all
want to feel like we're special to you, and worthy of your attention. We
want to be wanted. '296 Estrich is not contradicting herself; she's trying
to be helpful. But the nature of the advice is that you have to be you, and
the definition of you must convincingly articulate your desire to be a part
of that school.
Although truth-telling is the heart of personal statements, the appli-
cants' and schools' desire to be desired constantly influence the content
of that truth. Like in the religious confession, the truth in the essay
emerges from a structured method of self-analysis. The truth revealed is
a tangle of the self as perceived and the self as it wants to be seen.
C. EMPOWERMENT AND POWER
Religious confessions and personal statements both appear to em-
power the speaker. Religious confession is often viewed as a liberating
act and a way to take charge of one's destiny. According to Foucault:
290 Nicole Lawson, Nicole Lawson, in PROFILES & ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL AFRICAN
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291 Anthony Webb, Anthony Webb, in PROFILES & ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL AFRICAN
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 241, 241.
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[W]e no longer perceive [confession] as the effect of a
power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us
that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, "demands"
only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a
constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power
weighs it down, and it can finally be articulated only at
the price of a kind of liberation. 297
In the religious context, the power of the priest demanding the con-
fession becomes obscured, and instead the penitent experiences power
only when there are obstacles to confession. The urge to reveal our-
selves to others seems natural, and satisfying that urge is liberating.
The personal statement is similarly viewed as a liberating part of the
application process. Numbers-GPA and test scores-can only reveal
so much about an applicant. Grades and test scores are classic authorita-
rian exercises of power and constraints on self-expression.2 98 As noted
above, these measures are often criticized as structurally favoring
wealthy, white students while silencing others.2 99
Personal statements, on the other hand, are viewed as an alternative
to the numbers game, providing a chance for students to overcome struc-
tural biases. For example, when eight law school admissions officers
were asked whether they would eliminate personal statements if given
the opportunity, all eight answered, "No."' 300 The UC Berkeley adminis-
trator emphasized that it would "be irresponsible to use just two numbers
to make a decision. ' 30 1 The Duke official said, "Given that we can't
have face-to-face contact with every applicant, [the personal statement]
is the best way for us to see what applicants are like beyond their aca-
demic records. '302 The associate dean for admissions and financial aid
at George Washington University finds personal statements to be "some-
times more useful than the LSAT or the writing sample. '30 3 The assis-
tant director of admissions at UCLA stated, "The human element of a
personal statement cannot be replaced in any other part of an applica-
tion. ' '3°4 The assistant dean of admissions at University of Michigan said
the personal statement "provides a real window into the applicant's per-
sonality and character. '305 The University of Pennsylvania's dean of ad-
missions noted that the personal statement is his "favorite part of the
297 FOUCAULT, supra note 242, at 60.
298 See supra Part IV.D.
299 See id.
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application" and that it "bring[s] the applicant to life."' 30 6 The personal
statement is viewed as lifting the silencing constraints of numbers and
offering the applicant the chance to be her true self.
Admissions officers, however, are not simply passive readers of ac-
cidental, candid texts. Rather, like priests, administrators possess an im-
portant power-the power to admit or deny an applicant based, in part,
on her personal statement. Guidebooks amplify this power by evoking
the image of the bored and well-educated admissions officer who will
not hesitate to reject an applicant deemed unworthy of admission. For
example, an admissions officer from George Washington University Law
School notes in a coaching manual, "After thirty-one years of doing this,
there is a lot that bores me."'307 Susan Estrich, a law professor at the
University of Southern California, published her own coaching manual.
She advises:
Write about you, not about law .... Whoever is reading
your essay knows the stuff better than you. They also
know your numbers, and all that. They know your re-
sume.... Most young people haven't got a clue. Every
day, I meet young people from incredibly interesting and
powerful families who tell me that they've written es-
says about their views on international law. Asleep, I
know more about international law than they do. And
it's not even my area. So does whoever will read their
applications. 30 8
The coaching manuals quoted in these examples depict admissions
officers as vastly more powerful, experienced, and intelligent than the
applicants.
To earn admission, therefore, the applicant must prove her worthi-
ness by observing certain rules. In order to receive absolution, religious
penitents must give a "complete" confession. 309 Not any revelation can
meet this standard. Tentler describes how the Church versified the most
important qualities of a complete confession so that priests could easily
remember them.310 The verse read:
Let the confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful,
And frequent, unadorned, discreet, willing, ashamed,
Whole, secret, tearful, prompt,
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Strong, and reproachful, and showing readiness to
obey.311
Only confessions that met these standards resulted in absolution. 312
In the academic context, coaching manuals have meticulously de-
scribed and modeled the complete personal statement. First, a good per-
sonal statement is memorable but well-mannered. Great Personal
Statements for Law School, the coaching book that encourages applicants
to "data-mine" the darkest reserves of the self,31 3 also advises applicants
to picture a "tony cocktail party" at which the candidate is competing
with others to make a lasting impression on the "hosts"-the admissions
officers. 314 According to the book, "everything you say must communi-
cate a compact multidimensional message that's distinctive enough for
your hosts to remember long after other partygoers have made their
pitch. '315 Personal statements are portrayed as a marketing genre con-
sisting of sound bytes and pitches. An applicant must write her essay as
if she were alone at a "tony cocktail party," facing the possibility that
everyone might belong except for her. She should reveal something per-
sonal that is also ambitious, inoffensive, memorable, witty, and unique.
Foucault could have been talking about this party when he described the
religious confession as "the formidable injunction to tell what one is and
what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one
is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking. '31 6
Complete personal statements should also be professional. Law
School Essays that Made a Difference, the same coaching book that lists
"Tell the truth" as tip number four, lists as tip number one, "Be profes-
sional. ' 317 The book explains, "In your personal statement, you want to
present yourself as intelligent, professional, mature, and persuasive.
These are the qualities law schools seek in applicants. Moreover, these
are the qualities that make good lawyers. '318 Personal statements should
be wearing their suits, not their sweatpants. Good grammar, respectful
politics, and pleasant prose tell administrators that an applicant is profes-
sional enough to attend their school and to one day become a lawyer.
Personal statements are frequently considered a way to remove bar-
riers to getting to know an applicant. This view, however, obscures the
power relationship that elicits the statement in the first place. An essay is
not the candidate's chance to break the rules. Instead, it should represent
311 Id. at 107 (quoting St. Thomas's Commentary on Book IV of the Sentences).
312 Id.
313 BODINE, supra note 258, at 8.
314 id. at 6.
315 Id. at 6-7.
316 FOUCAULT, supra note 242.
317 OWENS, supra note 236, at 13-14.
318 Id. at 13.
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a well-disciplined, "intelligent, professional, mature, and persuasive"
candidate. 319 Applicants write them to be remembered, respected, ad-
mired, and admitted. Sometimes, these desires are so poignant and con-
flicting that an applicant will plagiarize or outright fabricate an
experience. Sometimes, these desires are primed to produce more artful
fictions.
D. THE COLORBLIND CALIBRATION OF UNIQUE VOICES
Up to this point, this article has compared personal statements with
religious confessions in order to demonstrate how personal statements
produce rather than reveal truth, knowledge, and selfhood. The article
will now turn to a particular type of knowledge produced by personal
statements: racial knowledge. There is a strain of racial knowledge
called diversity that both white and nonwhite applicants are building.
Specifically, the colorblind diversity standard encourages students to be
different but not too different. Because diversity classifies race as inter-
changeable with other extracurricular activities, applicants try to distin-
guish themselves without being permanently different. This racial
knowledge further reinscribes the colored colorblindness endorsed by the
Supreme Court and administered by schools.
Though students of all races and ethnicities participate in diversity
production, white students and students of color approach it differently.
Diversity translates sharp racial categories into a spectrum of difference.
It begins from the presumption that white candidates lack it and black
candidates have it in excess, but, because it is a standard, individual
members can theoretically access the desirable, gray, colorblind middle.
Applicants view themselves as members of certain groups who must
downplay the potential extremism of group membership. Students of
color often describe racial difference as a consciousness gap that they
hope to bridge. As nonwhites try to reconcile themselves with the domi-
nant culture, white applicants try to distinguish themselves from it.
Diversity has made its mark on three common elements of personal
statements: an emphasis on self-reliance in overcoming obstacles; a rep-
resentation of a core self that is coherent, centered, autonomous, and
aracial; and the self-endorsement of diversity as a racial policy consistent
with these values. White and non-white applicants frequently incorpo-
rate these elements into their essays, but each group does so in a way that
moves them to the center of the diversity standard (colorblindness) and
away from sharp racial categories (race consciousness).
319 Id.
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1. Diverse Personal Statements Emphasize Self-reliance in
Overcoming Racialized Obstacles
Self-reliance is a powerful theme that can help a candidate re-invent
herself from a racial category to a diverse individual. Kennedy defines
self-reliance as "an insistence on defining and achieving objectives with-
out help from others (i.e., without being dependent on them or asking
sacrifices of them). '320 In the diversity context, stories of hardship and
self-reliance take on added meaning as war stories from the racial
trenches. Candidates are careful, however, to emphasize their poverty (a
colorblind category) rather than skin color (an immutable, race-conscious
category). Students of color and white students both arrive at this color-
blind conclusion, though they approach it from opposite poles.
Students who identify as black might begin their essays from a per-
spective of racialized disadvantage, but then shift focus to class disad-
vantage: a problem considered possible to overcome through self-
reliance. The essay becomes a story in which the obstacle of poverty is
peppered with details that carry racial significance. For example, a black
student who described his coming of age in the South Side of Chicago
tells a story of being "approached by several threatening gang members
who demanded that [he] become initiated into their gang. ' 321 His refusal
"resulted in several months of torment, including physical and emotional
harassment by gang members. ' 322 The racial details, however, are not
the focus of this self-reliance story. Instead, the applicant focuses on the
aspects of his life that he could escape: poverty and a lack of education.
He writes, "As a direct result of the attacks, I became determined to
complete my education in civil liberties, enlist in the military, and utilize
my life experience to contribute to society. '32 3 The candidate emerged
from racially-coded attacks to take charge of his own life.
The life lessons learned from this racial experience strengthened in-
dividualist values and worldview. For him, the "perpetuation of the un-
derclass" is the result of "life without the chance of achieving economic
success."324 The applicant acknowledges a colorblind that is the product
of unequal opportunity, rather than unequal distribution of wealth or ra-
cial privilege. By framing his essay this way, he affirms the story that
self-reliance can transcend economic hardship, while providing just
enough racial coding of the obstacles to signal that he is black.
320 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1713 (1976).
321 Jarvis Wyatt, Jarvis Wyatt, in PROFILES AND ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL AFRICAN AMERI-
CAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 260, 261.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 260-61.
324 Id. (emphasis added).
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White students can also rely on racial code embedded in poverty
stories. In this context, however, these signifiers distinguish white appli-
cants from the pack. For example, one white applicant recounted how,
when he was very young, his father "disappeared as his world came to
revolve around drug addiction. '325 Concurrently, his mother "became a
welfare mom who spent her time partying, sleeping around, and dealing
drugs on the side."'326 When he was in first grade, his mother tried to
overdose on sleeping pills, and he was forced to move in with his aunt.327
After relating these obstacles, the applicant concludes that his self-reli-
ance values make him different (rather than transcendent):
With this kind of background, it may seem odd for me to
believe so adamantly that the reins of life are in our own
hands. It should be obvious to me that social and eco-
nomic forces beyond an individual's control constrain
both choices and opportunities. While this is an impor-
tant point, it seems to me that circumstances can only
confine those people who allow themselves to be
trapped. 328
This applicant also emerged from a racially-coded hardship (pov-
erty) to take charge of his own life. After acknowledging "social and
economic forces beyond an individual's control," the applicant arrives at
the same conclusion as the black applicant above: he is different because
he will not allow himself to be trapped.
These essays show how racially-identified applicants can use self-
reliance narratives to represent themselves as diverse individuals. But
each candidate emphasized different parts of the narrative. While the
black applicant wrote about overcoming racialized poverty, the white ap-
plicant wrote about overcoming racialized poverty. The black candidate
told the story to show that he is not too different, while the white candi-
date told the story to show he is not too ordinary.
2. Diverse Personal Statements Present a Centered Self that
Navigates Racial Stereotype and Individual Authenticity
The autonomous, centered self is a second popular theme of student
essays that has been influenced by diversity. Professor Gerald Frug de-
325 Jamie Alan Aycock, Jamie Alan Aycock's Personal Statement, in OWENS, supra note
236, at 145.
326 Id.
327 Id. While applicants of all races and ethnicities certainly encounter obstacles such as
drugs, welfare, and absent mothers, these hurdles are nonetheless highly racialized topics in
American consciousness. They become even more significant in an applicant's file, where
information is scarce.
328 Id.
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scribes the centered self as "a sense of self determinate enough to serve
as the touchstone for the pursuit of self-interest." 329 In the diversity con-
text, applicants often discuss this theme as the pursuit and ultimately
personal decision to reject group identity. Because of the colorblind pa-
rameters of diversity, applicants of all races and ethnicities can tell this
story, though again, applicants approach it from different starting points.
Students who identify as black often reject a naive pursuit of blackness in
favor of a more aracial self. Students who identify as white seek to dis-
tinguish themselves by highlighting their sensitivity to diversity issues.
Together, blacks and whites approach a conscientious, colorblind norm:
the student of color renounces hyper-conscious group associations, while
the white student renounces hyper-ignorant group associations. For eve-
ryone, the story ends with a happy, centered, self-aware individual mak-
ing her own decisions. In these essays, identity development is a linear
and autonomous process.
Professor Richard T. Ford has written that a double bind in identity
politics creates a yearning for a centered self.330 According to Ford, "on
the one hand, we want to assert our distinctive identity and have others
recognize it as distinctive. On the other hand, we want to avoid those
forms of recognition that we experience as demeaning or simply inaccu-
rate."'33' It is the centered self that decides whether a racial performance
is authentic or fraudulent; whether to embrace or resist a stereotype. 332
Ford provides the example of a young, black, unwed mother who
embraced her pregnancy as resisting white culture because the "autono-
mous rights-bearing individual [has] chosen, because the identity she ar-
ticulates comes from within (whereas the stereotype of Jezebel and the
disciplinary ideal of Mammy are imposed from without)." 333 Ford criti-
ques this model because it ignores how "identity is produced through
dialogue and recognition, not by internal and autonomous choices. 334
While Ford's article focuses on problematizing the self that chooses
to embrace a stereotype, this article examines essays that present cen-
tered individuals who can resist stereotype. 335 Applicants recoil from
stereotypes for the same reason that Ford's black, unwed mother might
adopt them: to demonstrate coherent and autonomous choices. 336 But
329 GERALD E. FRUG, CITYMAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
66 (1999).
330 Richard T. Ford, Beyond "Difference": A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics,
in LEFr LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 57 (Janet Halley & Wendy Brown eds., 2002).
331 Id.
332 Id. at 60.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 See Ford, supra note 330, at 38.
336 Id. at 57-60.
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regardless of whether one chooses to resist or embrace a stereotype, the
model of the centered self rejects the possibility that identities are contin-
ually "produced through dialogue and recognition. 337
One common way applicants who identify as black tell the choosing
story is by describing a trip to Africa. 338 In these stories, applicants dis-
cover that Africa was not the home they had expected. 339 One student
equated her trip to Zimbabwe with a search for a long-lost grandmother:
[G]oing to Africa ...meant that I could, for the first
time, connect with a part of my history that I hadn't a
chance to connect with in the past. For example, unlike
other African Americans, I didn't have a grandmother
who lived down the street and cooked fried chicken and
green beans for Sunday family dinner. My grandmother
was in Jamaica and I had only seen her a few times.
Africa meant an opportunity to connect with that side of
myself. When I exited the plane, I thought, secretly, that
I would be greeted with a hug from my estranged
family. 340
The applicant initially embraced positive cultural stereotypes that
African Americans eat fried chicken with their grandmothers every Sun-
day. She believed that people in Africa shared that cultural value, and
she went to Africa with the expectation of finding a country full of ex-
tended family. The applicant then continues the story with almost self
mockery of her secret hopes:
Well, it was no surprise that I was not. I was treated like
another tourist, which was disappointing. But what sur-
prised me further was how I was treated. I felt like I was
in Gone with the Wind, only in this version I am not the
maid, I am the white woman being waited on by the
black maid. The Zimbabweans did not feel close to me,
as I wanted to feel towards them. I was looked at as an
American. In their minds, being an American meant
privilege .... I now realize I am American more than I
am African, even more than I am Jamaican. I am proud
to embrace my Americanism because America repre-
sents opportunity. 341
337 Id. at 60.
338 See, e.g., Natasha N. Davis, Natasha N. Davis, in PROFILES AND ESSAYS OF SUCCESS-
FUL AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 74, 75.
339 See id.
340 Id.
341 Id.
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The applicant relates a story about deciding between embracing and
resisting stereotypical African roots. Her experience prompted her to re-
ject stereotypes about the kinship of black people around the world. In-
stead, she cast her lot with America because it affirms individualist ideas
like opportunity. Strikingly, the disorientation of visiting Zimbabwe re-
sulted in an easy choice, rather than a perpetual struggle with outsider
status in Zimbabwe, Jamaica, and the United States. This choice was
easy even though, as she embarked on the journey, she had previously
struggled with feeling disconnected from her past.
Also interesting is the substance of what this applicant chose to em-
brace: the colorblind ideology of American opportunity. 342 She nearly
echoes Peller's description of the colorblind ideals: "[T]o transcend ste-
reotypes in favor of treating people as individuals, free from racial group
identification. ' 343 The applicant found that the American legal system
was the best example of this opportunity: "As I tried to fathom why
America is so great, the one common denominator that I found was our
laws. Our system of government espouses that EVERYONE has inalien-
able, undeniable human rights. ' '344 She chose to call America home be-
cause it affirmed individualist, colorblind values.
Another black student discussed a similar experience when she trav-
eled to Senegal:
I thought I would finally have a place to call home, but
my idealized perception of the Motherland was continu-
ally fleeting. And although I was welcomed, I was nev-
ertheless an American, with fancy clothes, the privilege
of an American education, economic wealth, and oppor-
tunities. I was a minority and an outsider, just like I am
in America. 345
This applicant also did not adopt Ford's view that her self is contin-
ually reproduced through interaction and dialogue. Rather, she resolved
her disorientation by reproducing a nested set of choices for her self to
evaluate. She said the visit "allowed me to have the deep introspection
that I needed to let the issue of my identity come to a resting-place, a
place in which I was comfortable accepting.... To honor my ancestors I
am African, to recognize my circumstances I am American. I am Afri-
can-American. ' 346 This applicant's awareness of identity's double bind
342 Id.
343 Peller, supra note 8, at 768.
344 Davis, supra note 338, at 75.
345 Aisha Green, Aisha Green, in PROFILES AND ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL AFRICAN AMERI-
CAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 96, 97.
346 Id.
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strengthened, rather than undermined, her faith that a centered self can
negotiate stereotype and authenticity.
White applicants also use stories about travel to highlight their cen-
tered selves. Unlike black applicants, though, white candidates often dis-
cuss how travel made them different from other Americans, rather than
how it allowed them to fit more easily into American culture. For exam-
ple, one student wrote about going to live with her dad in Germany.
I may have lost my mother, my friends and my country,
but I discovered something new-the world. It is too
easy, sitting amid corporate coffee chains and grotes-
quely large super-stores, to assume that the world ends at
the shores of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, that life
exists only north of the Rio Grande and south of Niagara
Falls. 34 7
While traveling, the applicant discovered a latent, mainstream
group-think that had conditioned her to believe that Starbucks and
Safeway were reality. After traveling, her centered self rejected that
group-think and embraced a diverse world.348
American schooling is another common topic that showcases the
centered self. In contrast to Africa, coded as black, school for many
black applicants is coded as white. Black applicants frequently discuss
how they rejected group-think and embraced school, just as they had to
reject fantasies about Africa to embrace the United States. For white
applicants, school, like the world, offers diversity.
One black applicant, Telia Anderson, whose essay was part of a
successful transfer application, discussed her first days at Yale after
growing up in a black neighborhood:
When I spoke, I exposed my roots. It was so embarrass-
ing when my first-year college roommate did not under-
stand that I was responding affirmatively to her request
to borrow my Walkman when I said, "Yeah, you can
hold it." She was confused: "You want me to hold
it?" ... My roommate called these "Telia-isms." Mean-
while, my friends at home complained, "You sound like
a white girl." 349
The applicant then explains how she resolved her ambiguous iden-
tity. Sometimes, she did so by embracing the stereotype. For example,
347 American University 2007, in OWENS, supra note 236, at 67.
348 Id.
349 Telia V. Anderson, Telia V. Anderson's Personal Statement (Transfer), in PROFILES
AND ESSAYS OF SUCCESSFUL AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259,
at 30, 31.
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she learned that she did in fact speak correctly, according to grammatical
rules of Black Standard English: "Later taking a graduate linguistics
seminar, I learned that a statement for which I had been mocked, 'I be
going to the library,' was a grammatically correct sentence in Black
Standard English. '350 Sometimes, she rejected stereotypes in favor of
more traditional meritocratic, colorblind measures of success. She ex-
plains, "It was gratifying to finish the year with a 3.9 GPA and an invita-
tion to join the Law Review. More importantly, I closed the gap between
the dichotomy of my academic life and my African American commu-
nity. I was not the 'white girl' who lived away, but the 'lawyer' who had
returned home."' 351 Success did not make her white, it made her a lawyer
who could both work and go home whenever she wanted. Moreover,
like the applicant who traveled to Zimbabwe, she embraced a centered
self that could choose when to embrace or resist a stereotype. This self
was found in the colorblind American legal system. Lawyering, for her,
is not white or black. It is simply a synonym for herself; it mutes color
barriers, permitting her to transition easily between home, work, and
school.
Another black applicant discussed growing up in a poor Dallas
neighborhood and attending a magnet school:
Day after day I heard about how I was a "sellout" and
how I was a disgrace to the Black race. After a while the
"friends" that I had thought would support me through
almost anything turned against me .... Even I started to
believe that I was "losing my color" ..... But if I was
not Black, what was I?
[T]hose girls made me realize that I was not going to be
a puppet for anyone, whether it was "my people" or out-
siders. No matter what I do with my life I am going to
do it because I want to do it, not because I think it is
what anybody else thinks is right.352
Again, the applicant described a choice between identifying with a
white school or with her black friends. She tried to navigate this by
emphasizing the centered self that does the choosing. She embraced a
deep down, individual self that is distinct from both her people and out-
siders. Given her academic successes, it is clear that her choice was to
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Irene Joe, Irene Joe's Diversity Statement: Diverse Experience, in PROFILES AND Es-
SAYS OF SUCCESsFuL AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 113,
113-14.
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continue with school. But, in her story, her serious commitment was
* dependent upon stripping "school" of its white and black baggage. Even
though she believed that she was black when the alternative is oblivion,
she portrays the self that chooses as a colorblind individual following a
colorblind path, erasing both her people and the outsiders.
Because diversity makes race interchangeable with other qualities,
white students can tell the same story of choose one's own education
over group identities that hold them back, such as sports. However, in-
stead of embracing the colorblindness of school ("i.e., it isn't white, it's
school"), white applicants often highlight how education makes them dif-
ferent. For example, one student described his transition from what he
calls "Mr. Football is my life" to a serious student:
I guess it must have been hard to believe that I, Mr.
"Football is my life," would be able to achieve even half
of what he planned, so it is no wonder that, no sooner
had I finalized my plans, when both my first year aca-
demic advisor and my father declared that I would be
incapable of achieving my goals ... but I was confident
in my abilities .... Soon the New York Times editorial
page and the New Yorker would take the place of the
Boston Globe sports page and Sports Illustrated in my
life .... While I do at times regret leaving my football
career behind, there is no doubt that I am better for hav-
ing done so. 3 53
Like the black applicants described above, this applicant portrayed
himself as a centered individual that can resist a stereotype when no one
thought he could. Although his football identity marked him as simple-
minded and lazy, both to himself and to others, he chose to become
smart, motivated, and self-reliant. School also diversified him-his es-
say later describes how he took courses on subjects like Zorastrian phi-
losophy, opening his mind to the larger world.354
In all of these essays, the applicants rely on an aracial, but diverse,
centered self to reject a group-think stereotype and highlight their indi-
vidual authenticity. Each applicant, however, embraced a colored color-
blindness, portraying him or herself as different but not too different.
Thus, whereas experiences such as travel and school temper the differ-
ences of black students, such experiences enrich the differences of white
students.
353 Michael Leahy, Michael Leahy's Personal Statement, in ERIC OWENS, LAW SCHOOL
ESSAYS THAT MADE A DIFFERENCE 64-65 (3d ed. 2008).
354 Id.
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3. Diverse Personal Statements Advocate Sharing Unique
Individuality Through Cross Cultural Contact
A third theme of essays that diversity has influenced is that differ-
ences, though unique and unchangeable, should be shared. By sharing,
an individual's horizons are expanded and new opportunities arise. Irra-
tional prejudices are dispelled. After reading hundreds of personal state-
ments, one is struck by the isolation that wraps itself around each essay,
each confession. There is, ultimately, one "I" in a file. Diversity offers
itself as the solution to loneliness of difference.
Moreover, because students are careful that their difference does not
sound "too different," diversity appears to be a perfectly calibrated mod-
est solution to a modest problem. The diversity solution of cross-racial
contact looks a lot like colorblind integrationism. As Peller notes, color-
blindness assumes that the ignorance produced by isolation can be erased
by the knowledge attained in an integrated (diverse) school:
This deep link between racism and ignorance on the one
hand, and integration and knowledge on the other, helps
explain the initial focus of integrationists on public edu-
cation: Children who attended integrated schools would
learn the truth about each others' unique individuality
before they came to believe stereotypes rooted in igno-
rance. By attending the same schools, children would in
turn have equal opportunity at the various roles in Amer-
ican social life.355
The faith that a diverse education can erase the alienating differ-
ences between racial groups, and the simultaneous obscuring of the fac-
tors that establish those differences (including the mechanism of the
personal statement itself), is classic colorblind ideology reinscribed
within race consciousness.
Applicants treat racial difference as no more and no less than skin
deep, and they endorse diversity as the way to close the gap. Again,
however, applicants of color and white applicants gravitate toward this
norm from opposite sides of a diversity spectrum. Black applicants write
about cross-racial contact as a way to overcome what appears to be the
permanence of difference. In contrast, white students look to cross-racial
contact as a way to overcome their ordinariness. Thus, two distinct types
of racial performance complement and corroborate a colorblind ideal of
overcoming stereotype through cross-racial contact.
Black applicants often discuss how an initially racially isolating
event led to cross-racial contact and, ultimately, enlightened understand-
355 Peller, supra note 8, at 770.
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ing for everyone. For example, one candidate recounted reading aloud
her essay on The Scarlet Letter to her high school class.
[M]ost students agreed it helped them comprehend and
appreciate new aspects of the novel. However, one boy
snickered "unique" ideas were easier for me since I was
a "unique" student. Ironically, his sarcastic remark
sparked an epiphany . . . . I recognized that my back-
ground could enhance, even change, another person's
understanding of an event, situation or belief.356
Another black applicant discussed her visit to an elementary school
in Australia, where the children had never seen an African American.
She explains that the experience "opened [her] eyes and made [her] real-
ize that there are many things that Americans take for granted. We live
in a diverse nation with many different people and although there is a
dominant race, information is constantly exchanged to dissolve stereo-
types and promote interracial harmony. '357 Another black applicant, Di-
ana Walker, posed the question, "What is diversity?" and answered it this
way:
The presence of diversity in our lives is essential to en-
sure that all cultures and backgrounds of thought have a
voice in society. Diversity expands the realm of thought
from a narrow point of view towards public issues, to a
wide range of interpretations and solutions .... The im-
pact of diversity is more complex than just racial differ-
ences but also encompasses the unique life experiences
of each individual. 358
Although all of these statements contain a broad element of race
consciousness-they believe they have something to contribute as a re-
sult of living outside the dominant culture-the racial experience is both
reified and individualized. Race is, more than ever, a skin, an individual
organ. It is the applicants' indisputable beginning but it is not where
they end. For them, diversity allows them to keep their skin while pursu-
ing a transcendent interracial harmony in which individuals are ulti-
mately judged by the content of their character.
Diversity also allows white applicants to transcend their skin, to dis-
tinguish the content of their character. One white applicant wrote,
356 Deshalia Dixon, Deshalia Dixon's Personal Statement, in PROFILES AND ESSAYS OF
SUCCESSFUL AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 83, 83.
357 Green, supra note 345, at 96.
358 Diana Walker, Diana Walker's Personal Statement, in PROFILES AND ESSAYS OF SUC-
CESSFUL AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS, supra note 259, at 234, 234.
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My decision to apply to law schools followed a different
route than most. After attending a wealthier high school
that was racially and socially homogenous . . . I felt I
was missing out on the "real world." It was difficult for
me to shake the feeling that I wasn't truly experiencing
the diversity of the nation and the peoples and cultures
within it. I decided to move to Washington, DC, where I
felt I could further my interest in different cultures. 359
Reading this essay together with Ms. Walker's, described above,
illustrates how diversity implements the colorblind aspirations of integra-
tionism. Although both applicants have irreducible differences (skin
color, background, etc.), these differences are individual and mutable,
not group-based. They are, according to Ms. Walker, as individual as
any other "life experience." 360 Both applicants expect cross-cultural
contact to dispel any prejudice that attributes to skin color any additional
meaning. For both, cross-cultural contact is a mechanism of self-im-
provement, a tool created for the individual and used by the individual in
the hope of transcending unenlightened group politics.
In sum, personal statements tend to individualize racial difference as
irreducible yet mutable. In these essays, race is no more and no less than
skin deep. Because difference is carefully calibrated (different but not
too different), and because a centered individual can make choices about
stereotypes and authenticity, diversity sounds like an ideal remedy for
racial isolation and ignorance. Taking the personal statement's racial an-
nouncement as their beginning, applicants view diversity as a way to
learn about individual differences and then transcend them. Diversity
encourages a colorful colorblindness.
CONCLUSION
In 1966, B. Alden Thresher wrote: "There is, indeed, serious ques-
tion whether, above a certain 'floor' of ability, the college and the public
would not be better served by random selection of candidates than by the
kind of ignorant purposefulness many admissions committees delight to
exercise."' 361 Forty years later, the admissions process has moved full
speed in the opposite direction. The role played by personal statements
has expanded. Administrators have intensified their focus upon whether
the student has competently communicated her true identity and whether
that identity fits with an institution's mission.
359 Anonymous, The George Washington University Law School: Personal Statement, in
OWENS, supra note 236, at 78.
360 Walker, supra note 358, at 234.
361 THRESHER, supra note 135, at 75.
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My review of personal statements suggests that the current approach
has not fulfilled its promise. Applicant essays are far from a source of
candid, authentic, empowered, unique individuals that comprise our soci-
ety. The power relationship between applicant and admissions officer,
and the literature about what constitutes a good essay, undercuts the pos-
sibility that personal statements can give schools access to objective ra-
cial knowledge from the ground. In practice, personal statements often
read like highly standardized reaffirmations of the colorblind values that
also underpin the text of the Grutter decision and the administrative reac-
tions to the shadow it cast.
The administrator-student power relationship plays out in a network
of other power relationships; I have examined one between the Court and
administrators. The paradoxical effect of the interaction is a reinscrip-
tion of colorblindness within race consciousness by every key actor in
higher education admissions-the Court, the administrators, and the stu-
dents. Together, these actors produce a type of racial knowledge called
diversity that, on the surface, openly acknowledges group-based race
consciousness but, when digging deeper, reaffirms individualist values of
colorblindness.
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